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International agencies are facing heightened levels of security risk in conflict zones. The 
nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security environment have 
contributed to a situation whereby the threat of attack as well as recurring criminal violence 
are a constant reality for their employees, hindering their work and obstructing their access to 
people in need. Moreover, the ability of international agencies to conduct strategic risk 
assessment has been called into question.  
 The central research question of this study concerns whether an industry-specific 
political-security risk model can be applied successfully in order to assist international 
agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in conflict zones. In order to develop a 
political-security risk model for international agencies a number of supplementary research 
questions are asked. The first of these is what limitations the security risk models currently 
used by international agencies exhibit. The second question asks what factors and indicators 
should be included in an industry-specific political-security risk model for international 
agencies in conflict zones. So as to test the applicability of the model developed in this 
research study, the last question asks what the level of risk is for international agencies 
operating in the conflict zone in eastern Chad.  
 Using political risk theory, and drawing upon political risk models specific to the 
energy industry, this research study proposes an industry-specific political-security risk 
model for international agencies in conflict zones, in which the limitations of the current 
models used by international agencies to analyse security risks are overcome. The application 
of this model to eastern Chad returns an overall risk rating of extreme, which is the highest 
overall risk rating obtainable. By regularly utilising this model, international agencies are 
able to monitor the changing levels of security risk in a conflict zone and are therefore better 













Internasionale agentskappe trotseer tans verhoogde vlakke van sekuriteitsrisiko in 
konfliksones. Die aard van hedendaagse konflikte en die post-9/11 globale politieke 
sekuriteitsomgewing het bygedra tot ’n situasie waar die bedreiging van aanvalle sowel as die 
herhalende aard van kriminele geweld vir hul werkers ’n voortdurende realiteit is. As gevolg 
hiervan word werkers verhinder om hul verpligtinge uit te voer en na mense in nood uit te 
reik. Boonop word internasionale agentskappe se vermoë om strategiese risiko-asessering uit 
te voer nou bevraagteken. 
 Die hoofnavorsingsvraag van hierdie studie is: kan ’n industrie-spesifieke politieke 
sekuriteitsrisikomodel suksesvol toegepas word om internasionale agentskappe by te staan 
met strategiese politieke sekuriteitsrisiko-analise in konfliksones, al dan nie. Ten einde ’n 
politieke sekuriteitsrisikomodel vir internasionale agentskappe te ontwikkel, word daar ook 
’n aantal aanvullende navorsingsvrae gevra. Die eerste hiervan stel ondersoek in na die 
beperkings van die sekuriteitsrisikomodelle wat teenswoordig deur internasionale 
agentskappe gebruik word. Die tweede vraag vra watter faktore en indikators by ’n industrie-
spesifieke politieke sekuriteitsrisikomodel vir internasionale agentskappe in konfliksones 
ingesluit behoort te word. Ten einde die toepaslikheid  te toets van die model wat in hierdie 
studie ontwikkel is, stel die laaste vraag ondersoek in na die risikovlak vir internasionale 
agentskappe wat in die konfliksone van oostelike Tsjad werksaam is. 
 Met behulp van politieke risikoteorie en met gebruik van politieke risikomodelle wat 
spesifiek betrekking het tot die energie-industrie, propageer hierdie navorsingstudie ’n 
industrie-spesifieke politieke sekuriteitsrisikomodel vir internasionale agentskappe in 
konfliksones wat die beperkings van die modelle wat huidig deur internasionale agentskappe 
gebruik word, sal oorwin. Hierdie model se toepassing op oostelike Tsjad toon in die geheel 
’n risikowaarde van ekstreem, die hoogste algehele risikowaarde moontlik. Deur hierdie 
model gereeld te gebruik sal dit internasionale agentskappe in staat stel om die veranderende 
vlakke van sekuriteitsrisiko in ’n konfliksone te monitor; dus sal hulle meer ingeligte 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. General introduction and statement of topic 
A universal trait of contemporary conflict zones1 is the existence of a large contingent of 
international agencies2. Both the nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global 
political-security landscape has meant that over the last two decades international agencies 
have been called to operate in increasingly hostile environments such as Afghanistan, 
Somalia, Sudan and eastern Chad. International agencies are thereby exposing their staff and 
operational infrastructure to greater security risks (Bollettino, 2008: 263 and Bruderlein, 
2004: 1). According to the United Nations (UN) (IMDC, 2010) there were, for example, 192 
serious attacks against humanitarian staff in eastern Chad between January and September 
2009, including killings and abductions (IDMC, 2010).  
 The escalation of violence against aid workers is not limited to eastern Chad. 
According to Stoddard et al’s (2009: 33) seminal study - which tracks global incident data 
from all humanitarian aid contexts and identifies new trends in violence against aid workers - 
2008 saw violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers reach the highest toll in the 12 
years that the study has tracked these incidents. The increase in violence against aid workers 
identified by Stoddard et al (2009) has witnessed a corresponding investment by agencies 
into bolstering their security capabilities and systems. However, van Brabant (2001b: 31), 
Gassmann (2005: 3) and Bruderlein (2004: 1) respectively conclude that the risk assessment 
capabilities of international agencies are still limited, that most agencies admit a lack of 
knowledge of the contexts within which they operate, and that they have tended to increase 
their security capacity at a practical level without attention to the relevance of their security 
strategies. Limitations in the security architecture of international agencies are potentially 
devastating, especially given the highly insecure environments in which they operate on a 
daily basis. 
 Van Brabant (2001a: 1-2) reaches the crux of the matter in the following statement: 
“There is indeed an incompressible element of risk in humanitarian work, but good security 
management is also a tool to help agencies enter, and remain in danger zones, while the loss 
                                                           
1
 In this research study the term ‘conflict zones’ includes both active conflict environments as well as post-
conflict environments. 
2In this research study international agencies are understood as organisations involved in the provision of 
“...assistance (developmental, humanitarian, technical, or political) to governments, civil societies and 
populations affected by an armed conflict... Although these organizations may function under specific and 
divergent mandates, their staff and activities face similar security challenges”. This definition does not include 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other military-type operators (Bruderlein, 2004: 1).  
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of assets and especially staff, through accident or incident, impairs the ability of the agency to 
provide assistance”. It is here that the value of political risk analysis - and by definition, the 
sub-field of political-security risk analysis - as a tool that “aids in describing political 
phenomena in terms of factors of risk” and “tries to explain or understand the occurrence of 
political risk” can be realised for international agencies (Brink, 2004: 25). Political risk 
analysis is generally understood as “governmental or societal actions or policies, originating 
either within or outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or 
the majority of, foreign business operations and investments” (Simon, 1982: 68). Hence, 
political-security risk analysis, as a sub-field of political risk, is concerned with the security 
elements of political risk, including transnational security, national security and human 
security (Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming and Fouché, 2003: 18).  
 This research study is concerned with the limitations exhibited by the current security 
risk models3 used by international agencies to assess the security environments associated 
with conflict zones. Consequently, the core of this study is the application of the theoretical 
and methodological precepts of industry-specific4 political risk analysis to that of the 
relatively under-researched field of political-security risk analysis for international agencies 
in conflict zones. In this regard a model is developed that aims to enhance international 
agencies’ capacity for political-security risk analysis and in turn, their competence at risk 
mitigation and management. Thereafter, the focal point of this research study is the conflict 
zone of eastern Chad5 which has been selected as a case study. The high number of attacks on 
international agencies in eastern Chad in 2009 coincided with calls for an increased 
international agency presence due to the humanitarian crisis (USAID, 2010, UNOCHA, 2010 
and Kalin, 2009). Hence, international agencies’ ability to both identify and analyse security 
risk in eastern Chad is imperative for the successful provision of assistance and for the 
safeguarding of their employees’ lives. 
 
1.2. Literature review  
The literature on which this research study is based can be divided into three fields. The first 
is literature concerning political risk and political-security risk, which forms the theoretical 
basis of this research study. In terms of political risk analysis the main texts examined in this 
study are Brink’s (2004) Measuring Political Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment, Bremmer 
                                                           
3
 In this study referred to as a security risk model, but labelled varyingly by international agencies as a “security 
risk assessment” (UN, 2008: 51) or a “safety and security assessment” (Macpherson, 2004), among others. 
4
 In this study referred to as industry-specific political risk, but can also be referred to as micro political risk. 
5
 In this study the name eastern Chad is used to refer to the geographical region of Chad. 
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and Keat’s (2009) The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing, 
and Hough et al’s (2008) Threat and Risk Analysis in the Context of Strategic Forecasting. 
Furthermore, articles by Fitzpatrick (1983), Jarvis (2008), Kobrin (1978), Robock (1971) and 
Simon (1984, 1982) aid in the theoretical exposition of political risk and the analysis thereof. 
In terms of industry-specific political risk analysis and the models utilised within particular 
industries to determine political risk, Alon et al’s (2006) article, Managing Micropolitical 
Risk: A Cross Sector Examination, Boshoff’s (2010) Investing in Troubled Territories. The 
Oil and Gas Industry in the Ogaden in Eastern Ethiopia: An Increasing Political Risk to 
Foreign Investors and Howell’s (2007) Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis are 
particularly useful. The literature on political-security risk and the analysis thereof, is far less 
comprehensive and in this regard Fouché’s (2003) A Political Security Risk Analysis of 
Uganda, and Lambrechts et al’s (Forthcoming) Political Insecurity and the Extraction 
Industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Moving towards an Industry Specific 
Political-security Risk Analysis Model represent a starting point for further investigation, 
clarification and demarcation of this sub-field of political risk. With regard to the elements of 
political-security risk – transnational security, national security, and human security – the 
literature that will be examined includes Mathur (1996), Tarry (1999), Tadjbakhsh (2005), 
and Uzodike and Isike (2009). The material on political-security risk overlaps considerably 
with the second field of literature which deals with the security nexus within which 
international agencies are located. 
 In this respect, literature on the evolution and dynamics of the international agency 
industry is examined. Here, two related schools of thought stand out concerning the 
increasing insecurity of international agencies. Insecurity is attributed to the current political 
economy of conflict as well as to the post-9/11 global political-security landscape, both of 
which have contributed to the shrinking of humanitarian space and to the changing nature of 
assistance. On the nature and dynamics of contemporary conflicts in relation to international 
agencies, Sheehan (2008), Runge (2004), Bruderlein (2004), Fast (2007, 2010), and Kaldor 
(2006) are indispensable resources. Concerning the effects of 9/11 on the global political-
security landscape, Mills’ (2005) The Security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age 
of Terror is particularly relevant as it cogently summarises, reviews and investigates the 
major security challenges facing the world as a result of that event. With regard to the global 
political-security implications of 9/11 on the operations of international agencies, Krahenbuhl 
(2004), Harmer and Macrae (2003), and Hazan and Berger (2004) assist greatly. These 
authors address the themes of human security in post-9/11 humanitarian interventions, the 
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causes and consequences of the shrinking of humanitarian space since 9/11 and the risks 
faced by international agencies in the post-9/11 environment, among others. Another 
important bulk of literature used in this study is that detailing the security strategies of 
international agencies. The core documents are the security guides developed by international 
agencies, namely: Cooperative for Assistance Everywhere (CARE) International’s 
(Macpherson, 2004) Safety & Security Handbook, The European Commission for 
Humanitarian Aid’s (ECHO) (2004) Generic Guide for Humanitarian Organisations, and the 
UN’s (2008) The Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel 
and Premises Worldwide, and its (UN, 2004) Security Risk Management policy document. 
 Lastly, literature on the conflict in eastern Chad is utilised. This literature ranges in its 
scope so as to facilitate as deep an understanding of the various social, political, economic 
and historical dynamics that have played a part in determining the current situation in eastern 
Chad. Integral publications include Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) (HRW, 2009) report, The 
Risk of Return: Repatriating the Displaced in the Context of Conflict in Eastern Chad, which 
presents an international agency view of the risks inherent to operating in eastern Chad as 
well as the situation of refugees in this region. Additional reports by HRW are used 
extensively. In this regard, Violence Beyond Borders: The Human Rights Crisis in Eastern 
Chad (HRW, 2006b) details the dynamics of the conflict and its effect on individuals in 
eastern Chad. Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad (HRW, 2006a) is an in-
depth report on the linkages between the conflict in eastern Chad and the neighbouring 
Darfur region of Sudan. In terms of the origin of the current conflict in eastern Chad, The 
Enough Team’s (n.d) analysis entitled Chad: Roots of the Crisis is highly informative. 
Additional sources on the conflict in eastern Chad include USAID’s (2008, 2010) reports on 
the current humanitarian situation, Ploch’s (2009) report on the nature, causes and effects of 
instability in Chad, The Enough Team’s (2009) article on the various obstacles to 
peacemaking in Chad, and Alusala’s (2007) article which homes in on Chad’s conflict-ridden 
history. 
 
1.3. Research problem 
As mentioned in the introduction, international agencies are operating in increasingly hostile 
contexts within which their employees face life-threatening risks on a regular basis. While 
international agencies have always operated in inhospitable environments, it is argued by 
Bollettino (2008: 263), Gassmann, (2005: 1), Fast (2010: 2), and Runge (2004: 233), among 
others, that the nature of their involvement and that of the context in which they operate has 
5 
 
changed over the last two decades. Since the 1990s the nature of conflict has shifted. Inter-
state conflict has been supplanted by more amorphous forms of conflict, including intra-state 
conflict, terrorism, and criminal violence. The central feature of these conflicts is the 
involvement of non-state or non-traditional actors; the non-adherence of warring parties to 
international humanitarian law; the increased targeting of civilians by warlords and militia; 
the blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians; the proliferation and 
therefore easy access for combatants to small arms and light weapons; and the central 
concern of parties to the conflict with the access to and control of strategic resources such as 
food, oil, diamonds, and water (Sheehan, 2008: 214, Bruderlein, 2004: 3-4 and Kaldor, 2006: 
2). 
 Within this culture of impunity, international agencies are perceived as legitimate and 
soft targets that can be attacked without major consequence for the perpetrators (Runge, 
2004: 234). Indeed, as supporter of the victims (who are often indistinguishable from the 
perpetrators) in conflict zones, international agencies are no longer regarded as impartial, 
neutral parties to the conflict (Runge, 2004: 234). Moreover, as providers of scarce 
humanitarian resources to vulnerable populations, aid has gained a strategic dimension in 
conflict zones due to the value attached to such resources by warring parties. The “shrinking 
of humanitarian space” and the politicisation of aid have also been accelerated by the events 
of 9/11 and the ensuing global political-security landscape (Hazan and Berger, 2004). 
International agencies have since come to be associated with a Western, often Christian 
agenda, as humanitarian aid has been used to engender support for military and political 
ambitions (Hazan and Berger, 2004). Within this milieu international agencies have become a 
“chosen, deliberate and direct” target for warring parties in conflict zones, thereby 
highlighting the imperative of excellent security management systems (Gassmann, 2005: 1).  
 While the above developments have elicited scrutiny and review of international 
agencies’ security management systems, risk analysis, which is a “necessity... as part of the 
very first needs assessment, prior to going into or returning to a dangerous zone” has been 
somewhat neglected and undervalued. Limitations in the capacity of international agencies to 
conduct risk analyses have been documented by Gassmann (2005), Bollettino (2008), Runge 
(2004), Fast (2007), van Brabant (2001b), and Bruderlein (2004). Moreover, international 
agencies are described as having “inadequate tools for conducting risk assessments”, and 
“limited” competence at risk assessment (Bollettino, 2008: 265, and van Brabant, 2001b: 5).  
 The “tools” currently utilised by international agencies are matrix-based security risk 
models, in which one simply plots risk on a graph based on the perceived impact of a threat 
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and the probability of the threat occurring (Bollettino, 2008: 265). Depending on where the 
risk lies on the matrix, according decisions can be made (ECHO, 2004: 141, UN, 2008, and 
UNHCR, 2007: 23-24). These models, though easy to use and understand, do not provide the 
type of comprehensive and detailed industry-specific political risk analysis that is seen in 
organisations in the energy industry, the automotive industry, or the financial industry (see 
Howell, 2007, and Alon et al, 2006). Industry-specific political risk analysis in these 
industries enables organisations at minimum, to recognise and anticipate the political risks 
and thereby make informed decisions on how to deal with these risks. This study aims to 
apply the principles of industry-specific political risk analysis found in the energy industry to 
the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international 
agencies. Moreover, drawing from Brink (2004: 4) who suggests that the identification of 
internal (originating from inside the host country) and external political risk factors6, as well 
as macro (generic) and micro (specific) factors are important for the development of a 
political risk model, it is hoped that this study, which is focused on the creation of a political-
security risk model, will enhance the capacity of international agencies to recognise and 
anticipate the industry-specific political-security risks inherent to conflict zones in general, 
and eastern Chad in particular. Based on the above depiction of the issues faced by 
international agencies, as well as the documented shortcomings of their current security risk 
models, Brink’s (2004: 3) statement that there is “certainly a need for new research and novel 
approaches to the field of political risk analysis” is taken to heart. Thus, the main research 
question of this research study is: 
• Can an industry-specific political-security risk framework be applied successfully in 
order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in 
conflict zones? 
Three supportive research questions have also been identified: 
• Looking at the current security risk models utilised by international agencies, what 
limitations can be identified? 
• What are the political-security risk factors and indicators that should be included in a 
political-security risk model for international agencies? 
While the above research questions are concerned with the development of an industry-
specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones, the final 
                                                           
6
 The term risk factor is sometimes referred to as a risk variable, of which the components are risk indicators, 
which are also sometimes referred to as sub-factors or sub-variables. For the purposes of this study, the term 
risk factor will be used and the component parts will be referred to as risk indicators.  
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supportive research question tests the practical application of this model through a case study 
of the conflict zone in eastern Chad. International agencies in eastern Chad have been subject 
to incidents7 including carjackings, murders, banditry, and kidnappings. Moreover, criminal 
incidents against humanitarian staff increased to the highest level in recent years in 2009 with 
192 serious attacks against humanitarian staff between January and September (USAID, 
2010: 2). There have also been recent calls highlighting the need for an increased presence of 
international agencies in this conflict zone (USAID, 2010, UNOCHA, 2010, and Kalin, 
2009). A political-security risk analysis of eastern Chad is thus both timely and relevant. The 
final research question is therefore:  
• What level of political-security risk does eastern Chad pose for international 
agencies? 
 
1.4. Objectives and relevance of the research study 
The objectives of this research study are twofold. The general objective is to examine the 
links between the operation of international agencies in conflict zones and the political-
security risks therein. Specifically, this study aims to enhance international agencies’ capacity 
for strategic risk analysis in conflict zones through the development of an industry-specific 
political-security risk analysis model. The relevance of this objective lies in the similar 
concerns expressed by the following authors. Firstly, van Brabant (2001b: 31) finds that 
“[agencies’] competence at risk assessment is still very limited”. Gassmann (2005: 3) notes 
that “[m]ost agencies admit that they have insufficient knowledge of the context in which 
they operate”, and lastly, Bruderlein (2004: 1) argues that “international agencies have been 
inclined to expand their security capacity at a technical level rather than reviewing the 
relevance of their security strategies”. The related conclusions reached by the above authors 
point to a weakness within the security architecture of international agencies and to a need for 
further research to be done in this field. Another factor contributing to the relevance of this 
study is the increasingly hostile and insecure circumstances in which international 
organisations are called to operate, as elucidated earlier in this chapter (Stoddard et al 2009: 
33, Bollettino, 2008; 263, and Bruderlein, 2004: 1). Within such an environment there is a 
need for continuous and innovative scholarship which aims to enhance the capacity of 
agencies to recognise, identify, analyse, and ultimately manage these security risks.  
 Secondly, this research study aims to ascertain the level of political-security risk in 
eastern Chad through the application of the industry-specific political-security risk model. 
                                                           
7
 See Appendix A: Chronology of recent incidents involving international agencies in eastern Chad. 
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The purpose, therefore, is to test the practical application and relevance of the model for 
international agencies in conflict zones as well as to measure the current level of political-
security risk for international agencies in eastern Chad. Eastern Chad, which borders on the 
highly unstable Darfur region of Sudan, is a most relevant case study. Eastern Chad is 
identified by USAID (2010) as exhibiting “an increased need for humanitarian services” due 
to pervasive conflict, mass displacements and limited resources. This is corroborated by 
UNOCHA (2010) and Kalin (2009). In light of the scope of this thesis, eastern Chad is a 
highly topical case study as international agencies may be looking at both entering Chad 
and/or prolonging their presence in this conflict zone. Secondly, the humanitarian situation in 
Chad has deteriorated over the last year, due to an increase in incidents of armed attacks and 
kidnappings (USAID, 2010: 1). In fact, out of all aid worker attacks over the last three years, 
three-quarters took place in just six countries (in descending order: Sudan, Afghanistan, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Chad, Iraq and Pakistan) (Stoddard et al, 2009: 4). The above findings 
point to the fact that eastern Chad is a challenging conflict zone for international agencies to 
work in, especially given its geographical proximity to Darfur and the intertwined nature of 
these two conflict zones. Hence, international agencies’ capacity to perform strategic risk 
analysis in this area is of extreme importance in effectively safeguarding their employees and 
ensuring the successful completion of their mandates. 
 
1.5. Research design and research methodology 
The purpose of this research study is as a descriptive, exploratory and explanatory analysis of 
the political-security risks associated with international agencies in conflict zones. It is 
descriptive8 in the sense that it aims to paint a picture of the field of political risk and 
political-security risk, as well as the evolution of the international agency industry in conflict 
zones (Neuman, 2006: 35). It is explanatory9 as it endeavours to explain the links between 
political-security risk in general, and eastern Chad in particular, and the international agency 
industry. Lastly, it is explorative10 in that it explores the possibility of an industry-specific 
political-security risk model for the international agency industry based on a synthesis of the 
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 Descriptive research is “research in which the primary purpose is to ‘paint a picture’ using words or numbers 
and to present a profile, a classification of types, or an outline of steps to answer questions such as who, when, 
where, and how”(Neumann, 2006: 35). 
9
 Explanatory research is “research in which the primary purpose is to explain why events occur and to build, 
elaborate, extend, or test theory” (Neumann, 2006: 35) 
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 Explorative research is “research in which the primary purpose is to examine a little understood issue or 
phenomenon to develop preliminary ideas and move toward research questions by focusing on the ‘what’ 
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more theoretical political risk models in the energy industry and the more practical models 
currently used by international agencies.  
 The methodology of this study is qualitative research, which makes use of the analysis 
of primary and secondary data. Chapter two of this study will make use of secondary data, 
including academic journals, books sourced from the University of Stellenbosch library, and 
international agency publications. This chapter provides the theoretical basis for the 
remainder of the study.  
 Chapter three will also make use of secondary data to analyse the international agency 
industry and the political-security risks associated with it. The information will be sourced, 
once again, from books and academic journals located within the University of Stellenbosch 
library, as well as from online sources such as international agency databases. In this chapter 
the strengths and limitations pertaining to international agencies’ security risk models will 
also be assessed, through the close analysis of three international agencies’ security risk 
models. The models originate from three primary sources: CARE International’s (2004) 
Safety & Security Handbook; The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid’s (2004) 
Generic Guide for Humanitarian Organisation; and the UN’s (2008) The Report of the 
Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, and its 
(UN, 2004) Security Risk Management policy document. The examination of how these 
international agencies perform security risk analyses reveals limitations in the sense that their 
security risk models are simplistic and rather vague and are therefore inadequate for 
providing a rich analysis of the political-security risks prevalent in contemporary conflict 
zones. This indicates a need for further research into how these models can be enhanced and 
provides the motivation for the development of a more comprehensive industry-specific 
political-security risk model for international agencies.  
 Chapter four will make use of secondary data, including journal articles and books 
from the University of Stellenbosch library, online newspaper articles and international 
agency documents. Firstly, these sources will be used to provide a contextual analysis of the 
origin and drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad. Thereafter, they will assist in the 
application of the industry-specific political-security risk model developed for international 
agencies in chapter three, to the conflict zone of eastern Chad.  
 The level of analysis in this research study is micro in scope due to the fact that it 
focuses specifically on the international agency industry within the broader field of 
peacekeeping and conflict prevention actors, organisations and businesses that tend to emerge 
in and around conflict zones. The units of analysis, otherwise known by Neuman (2006: 58) 
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as “[parts] of social life that [are] under consideration” are, in this research study, 
international agencies operating in conflict zones. 
 
1.6. Limitations and delimitations of the research study 
A first limitation of this research study is related to the discipline of political risk. Consensus 
on the precise meaning of the term has not yet been achieved (Alon et al, 2006: 624). Indeed 
the subjective nature of this field and the tendency for definitions to “range between the 
general... and the specific”, makes this field rather difficult to conceptualise (Fitzpatrick, 
1983: 249-250). Another related limitation is that the sub-field of political-security risk is, 
therefore, even less precisely defined and hence, more subjective. These limitations though, 
are not debilitating, and will be dealt with in chapter two of the research study by analysing 
various definitions in order to be able to suggest the most informed conceptualisation of these 
terms.  
 Secondly, although a full industry-specific political-security risk model for 
international agencies in conflict zones is developed in this research study, aspects pertaining 
to international agency-specific political-security risk11 will not form part of the political-
security risk analysis of eastern Chad in chapter four. Particularities such as agency 
affiliations, history, culture, and ideology play a large part in determining international 
agencies’ exposure to political-security risk in a conflict zone. However, due to the fact that 
the political-security risk analysis in this research study is not being conducted for a 
particular agency, such knowledge is unobtainable. A related limitation concerns the political 
risk models used by the energy industry and which are drawn upon in order to facilitate the 
development of a political-security risk model for international agencies. The models used 
are not always available to the public as they are considered an intellectual property right of 
the company that produced them. Therefore, knowledge about these models is often 
incomplete, as scholars have determined the model’s characteristics through the actions taken 
by the companies that use them (Boshoff, 2010: 8).  
 As elucidated previously, the method of primary and secondary data analysis has been 
chosen over other methods based on the ability of this type of data analysis to best answer the 
research questions posed in this study. While the use of field research could have added an 
extra richness to this research study, the lack of funding to undertake this type of research 
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 As can be seen in Figure 3: Outline of industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international 
agencies in conflict zones and Figure 4: An industry-specific political-security risk model for international 
agencies in conflict zones. 
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made it impossible. In addition, the time constraints on the duration of this research study 
made it unfeasible for fieldwork to be done. An associated limitation concerns the language 
barriers of using eastern Chad as a case study. French and Arabic are the main languages 
spoken and this makes fieldwork in, and research on, eastern Chad difficult. However, the 
existence of a large body of English research and publications on eastern Chad means that the 
language limitation of using eastern Chad as a case study is not prohibitive.      
 This research study will be conducted within the following delimitations. Firstly, it is 
limited to the analysis of three international agencies’ security risk models. This is due to 
space constraints and the fact that the models are fairly similar and therefore analysing 
additional security risk models would prove repetitive. This study is also narrow in its scope 
as it only looks at political-security risk at the possible expense of other forms of risk such as 
country and financial risk. The reason for the narrow focus on security is firstly, due to the 
findings by Stoddard et al (2009), Brabant (2001), Gassmann (2005), Fast (2007), and 
Bruderlein (2004), among others, which point to an increased need for specific research into 
the security architecture of international agencies. A secondary concern relates to time and 
space constraints, which effectively prevent a larger scope for this study.  
 The period under consideration in eastern Chad is from January 2003 to May 2010. 
Thus, only data up to May 2010 is taken into consideration. The reasoning behind the choice 
of this period is that from 2003 onwards the international agency presence in eastern Chad 
intensified due to the influx of refugees from the neighbouring Darfur conflict zone. The 
presence of international agencies during this time also coincided with the onset of hostilities 
in eastern Chad in 2005 (IFRCRCS, 2009: 1 and USAID, 2010: 1). For the purpose of 
providing a background analysis of the origin and drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad in 
chapter four, this research study looks further back time.  
 A final delimitation concerns the scope of this research study. According to Bremmer 
and Keat (2009: 14), “Understanding risks is only half the game. They must also be 
effectively communicated”, followed by “[t]he final step in the process – mitigation”. This 
study addresses political-security risk analysis, which is but the first step in a process that 
includes political-security risk mitigation and management. The choice to focus on analysis 
only was made on the basis that it would facilitate in-depth research on this particular aspect 
of political-security risk which has been identified in this chapter as an aspect in need of 
academic attention. Another reason is due to space constraints, which rules out the inclusion 




1.7. Chapter outline for the remainder of the research study 
The focus of chapter two is on the underlying theory of political-security risk. Here, the key 
terms to be used in this research study are conceptualised, beginning with a brief look at 
decision-making and problem-solving theory, followed by central concepts such as risk, 
political risk, country risk, and of course, political-security risk. Essentially, this chapter 
provides a foundation from which an industry-specific political-security risk model for 
international agencies in conflict zones in general, and eastern Chad in particular, can be 
developed.  
 Chapter three’s focus is on political-security risk analysis specific to international 
agencies. Here the relationship between international agencies, contemporary conflicts and 
the post-9/11 global political-security landscape will be examined in order to illuminate the 
evolving dynamics between political-security risk and international agencies. Thereafter, a 
discussion and analysis of three political risk models from the energy industry will be 
undertaken with the aim of highlighting and extracting aspects of these models relevant to the 
development of an industry-specific political-security risk framework for international 
agencies. The security risk models currently used by three international agencies – CARE 
International, ECHO, and the UN – will then be detailed with an eye to identifying the 
limitations that they exhibit. Chapter three culminates in the formulation of a two-step 
political-security risk model specific to international agencies operating in conflict zones. 
 In chapter four, a political-security risk analysis will be presented of eastern Chad, in 
relation to the international agencies operating or planning to operate in this region. Firstly, 
step one of the political-security risk analysis for international agencies will provide a 
conflict analysis of eastern Chad focusing specifically on the origin and drivers of this 
conflict. Thereafter, in step two, the political-security risk model developed for international 
agencies in conflict zones will be tested by applying it in a case study of eastern Chad.  
 Chapter five concludes this research study with an initial overview of the course of 
this research study. Thereafter, the research embarked upon in chapters two, three, and four is 
evaluated in relation to the research questions and the stated aims and objectives of this study. 
Finally, a number of recommendations for further research in the field of political-security 
risk and international agencies are made. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
This chapter serves as both a general introduction to the research study as well as a technical 
roadmap in terms of the research questions to be addressed, the objectives and relevance of 
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the study, the methodology and design, and the limitations and delimitations. This study is 
primarily concerned with whether an industry-specific political-security risk framework can 
be applied in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk 
analysis. Through a case study of eastern Chad, the practical application of the model which 
is developed in this research study will be tested in order to gauge the current level of 
political-security risk pertaining to international agencies in this conflict zone. The following 
chapter will begin this journey by providing the theoretical perspective of this research study 





Chapter 2: Theoretical perspective and conceptualisation 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In a world increasingly characterised by political insecurity and uncertainty, the discipline of 
political risk and the analysis thereof, is more relevant than ever for international 
organisations (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 3). Organisations are required to deploy to areas of 
high political risk on a more frequent basis. This can be seen in the energy and extraction 
industry and the international agency industry in which the nature of organisations requires 
their operations to be situated in politically unstable environments or in the midst of a conflict 
zone. Thus, the demand for a way of “knowing what is out there” has been met through the 
development and application of political risk analysis, in which “[t]hese threats can then be 
observed and measured”(Brink, 2004: 3). 
 As a discipline, risk analysis has a long history, the evolution of which is aptly 
described by Jarvis (2008: 1) as comprising a “seemingly perennial body of literature that has 
boomed and waned in concert with events in the international political economy”. The 
relevance of political risk analysis and its recognition as a discipline first came about during 
the 1970s in the aftermath of the tumultuous events of the 1973 oil crisis. It was here that 
organisations realised the importance of considering political variables in their risk analyses. 
The field was thought to have reached its apex during the height of the Cold War and by the 
1990s it seemed that it had lost much of its momentum. This stagnation was not matched by a 
decrease in demand for political risk analyses, quite the opposite actually, due to 
globalisation and the increasing complexity of the environment in which organisations were 
operating. Indeed, the world has experienced a distinct increase in political insecurity: 
“Increased uncertainty and the salience of non-traditional business and societal risks such as 
terrorism, corruption, climate change and global warming... have not only increased the 
awareness of risk in a complex environment, but have also increased the demand for risk 
analysis” (Hough et al, 2008: 6). Consequently, “[t]here is certainly a need for new research 
and novel approaches to the field of political risk analysis” (Brink, 2004: 3).    
 The purpose of the following chapter is to delve into the theory of risk and risk 
analysis in order to facilitate the eventual focus on political-security risk analysis and the 
development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies. 
In order to offer a concise and relevant conceptualisation of political-security risk and the 
analysis thereof, clarification and consensus needs to be reached on the notoriously “difficult 
to define” concept of political risk (Alon et al, 2006: 624). This will be done by looking at the 
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theoretical foundation of risk analysis, which is decision-making and problem-solving theory, 
and thereafter by locating political risk analysis within the field of risk and risk analysis. 
 
2.2. Decision-making and problem-solving theory: A theoretical foundation 
The roots of political risk analysis can be readily traced to problem-solving and decision-
making theory. Problem-solving is described by Simon et al (1987: 11) as a process of 
“fixing agendas, setting goals, and designing actions”, with the next step being decision-
making in which “evaluating and choosing among alternative actions” happens. At the same 
time, decision-making also displays values and interprets life and it is a central part of 
modern Western ideology, linked to the concepts of the “age of reason” such as the control 
over one’s destiny and human will (March, 1994: 225). In the decision-making process, 
individuals and organisations are taken to be rational and, therefore, risk-averse actors who 
aim to minimise their uncertainty with the help of detailed knowledge. Hence, a decision 
problem is defined by the options or acts among which one must choose, the potential 
outcomes or consequences of these options and the contingencies or conditional probabilities 
that relate outcomes to acts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981: 453). Extrapolating from the 
above, political risk analysis, according to Brink (2004: 30), “draws the decision-maker’s 
attention to the various problems that political risks might pose to the profitability of the 
investment”, or, in the case of this research study, the success of the humanitarian mission. 
Political risk analysis is therefore a “rational attempt at problem solving” (Brink, 2004: 30).  
 Political risk analysis represents a first step in the decision-making process and a way 
through which a decision problem can eventually be resolved. There are a number of steps 
involved in decision-making: “conceptualizing the idea to invest or expand operations, 
conduct a feasibility study of possible outcomes, prepare detailed specification, 
implementation of the decision, and eventual operation of the preliminary concept” (Chicken, 
1986). For example, in this research study, a political-security risk analysis would enable 
international agencies to ascertain the level of political-security risk in a given country. This 
is done through the collection of in-depth information and data on various aspects relating to 
the conflict zone, including the political-security elements of the conflict zone and their 
reciprocal impacts on the international agency. These are then processed into a meaningful 
picture, through the use of an industry-specific model made up of various risk factors and 
variables. On the basis of this detailed analysis, informed decisions can then be made as to 
the best course of action (Brink, 2004: 32). Indeed, understanding a decision in a specific 
situation clearly requires a great deal of concrete contextual knowledge, which March (1994: 
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vii) describes as “details about the historical, social, political, and economic worlds 
surrounding the decision and about the individuals, organizations, and institutions involved”. 
The relevance of political risk models in the decision-making process is that they are not 
static and they can be used continually as new information from constantly changing 
environments comes to light (Brink, 2004: 32). Rooting political risk analysis in decision-
making and problem-solving theory is instrumental in showing how political risk analysis is, 
in essence, a logical attempt at dealing with the vast uncertainty that prevails in this world.  
 
2.3. Conceptualisation of core terminology 
The central aim of this section is to conceptualise the core terminology utilised in this 
research study. This will aid in furthering an understanding of political risk and political-
security risk and assist in the development of an industry-specific political-security risk 
model for international agencies in chapter three. To commence this section, the concept of 
risk is looked at. This is followed by a discussion in which political risk and country risk will 
be differentiated. Due to the existence of many and varied definitions of political risk, some 
time will be spent on surveying various author’s conceptualisations in order to be able to 
posit a definition of political risk that will be used for the remainder of the study and that will 
assist in the conceptualisation of political-security risk. Thereafter, attention is paid to the 
differences between industry-specific (micro) and macro political risk. This is an important 
distinction to make, bearing in mind that this study is industry-specific in scope. The concept 
of political-security risk will then be addressed in some detail, as this definition will be used 
in designing a political-security risk model for international agencies. The discussion will 
then turn to the merits of qualitative and quantitative approaches to political-security risk 
analysis in an effort to explain and justify the development of a mixed-method model in the 
subsequent chapter. This chapter culminates in the conceptualisation of the terms, 
international agency and conflict zone. 
 
2.3.1. Risk and risk analysis 
There are numerous general definitions of risk. Hough et al (2008) posit that risk is the 
“undesirable and potential harm or danger to anyone that results from behaviour and action, 
or from a particular event, situation or issue”. Bremmer and Keat (2009: 4) define risk as the 
“probability that any event will turn into a measurable loss”, and Swaney (1996: 463) 
similarly defines it as the “likelihood that an agent or hazard will produce an unwelcome 
outcome or adverse effect and the severity of that adverse effect”. Hence, following Bremmer 
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and Keat (2009: 4), risk is made up of two variables - probability and impact. In this sense 
risk constitutes a probabilistic assessment and not an exact prediction (Hough et al, 2008: 10). 
It can also be gathered from the above definitions of risk, that the impact of risk on an 
organisation is usually negative. This can be seen through the terms that risk is associated 
with, such as danger, uncertainty, peril, jeopardy, instability and hazard. Though related to 
these terms, risk is not synonymous with them. This distinction needs to be made particularly 
clear with regard to the terms uncertainty and instability, with which risk is often wrongly 
equated. Uncertainty and instability can both be regarded as properties of risk. Instability 
refers to “unexpected or unforeseen” changes originating within the environment (Brink, 
2004: 19). Hence, instability is a property of the environment, whereas risk is a property 
specific to the organisation (Kobrin, 1978: 114). Similarly, uncertainty refers to the existence 
of insufficient information and implies an inability to determine either the probability or the 
impact, or both, of a certain future event. The difference between risk and uncertainty is 
information. Information is therefore the crucial element in enabling organisations to convert 
uncertainty into risk that is at least, “measurable, insurable, and avoidable” (Haendel et al, 
1975: 46 in Kobrin, 1979: 68). It also needs to be remembered that risk can be associated 
with possibility. Accordingly, risk is “not always a bad thing” as it may have good outcomes 
as well as negative ones (Bremmer, 2005: 60 and Hough et al, 2008: 10). However, it can be 
concluded from the above definitions that risk is generally understood to imply the possibility 
of negative results for an organisation rather than positive results.  
 Building on the above conceptualisation of risk, the term analysis indicates “historic, 
current, as well as future investigation, and aims to interpret something in terms of its effects” 
(Brink, 2004: 25). Therefore, a risk analysis is the result of an interpretation of risk in terms 
of its effects on a given organisation or entity. Risk analysis though, can be broken down into 
different sub-fields, of which political risk analysis is but one. In order to better understand 
what political risk entails, the concept of country risk needs to be addressed first.  
 
2.3.2. Country risk 
It is useful to distinguish between country risk and political risk at this early stage as the two 
terms are often used interchangeably (Alon, 2006: 624). Indeed, regarding the definition and 
attributes of country risk, much debate and disagreement exists between scholars. For the 
purpose of this research study, country risk is regarded as being of a larger scale than 
political risk. In this sense country risk is viewed, in the words of Brink (2004: 18), as a 
“specialized cousin” of political risk through its inclusion of economic, financial, social, and 
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political risk characteristics in its effort to forecast situations in which investors will find 
problems in the national circumstances of a country (Howell, 2007: 7 and Brink, 2004: 18). 
Brink (2004: 18), though stating that country risk factors could be included as variables in a 
political risk analysis, finds it more useful to distinguish country risk as “potential financial 
losses due to problems arising from macro economic events in a country” which include a 
country’s “sovereign, credit and transfer risk”. Building on the above, Cosset (1991: 135) 
views country risk as “the likelihood that a sovereign borrower will default on its debts”. 
Therefore, country risk analysis reflects a country’s general investment climate or ability to 
repay loans to banks, states, or monetary organisations (Brink, 2004: 22).  
 A useful way of thinking about the differences between country and political risk is 
that country risk is reflective of a country’s (in)ability to repay loans, while political risk 
relates to a country’s (un)willingness. What this means is that though a country may be 
perfectly able to repay a loan, due to political reasons such as ideology or the personal 
inclination of a leader, it may be unwilling to do so. For this reason, measures of country risk 
and those of political risk can reflect completely different levels (Brink, 2004: 23). Country 
risk is thus concerned with issues of finance and more precisely, the state of a country’s 
balance of payments. However, fluctuations in this regard are often symptomatic of deeper 
political problems that could best be identified in a detailed political risk analysis. The use of 
country risk analysis is, therefore, enriched by the use of political risk analysis and vice-versa 
as both contribute different elements to an analysis.  
 Related to the above, is the emphasis of country risk on a broad range of factors, such 
as economic, financial, political and social risks whereas, by definition, political risk has a 
singular focus on political risk factors. As Oetzel et al (2001: 120) argue, causation in country 
risk is often hard to determine as economic, political and social risk factors are frequently 
lumped into a single index, making it difficult to establish which variables are correlated with 
risk. Robock (1971: 8-9) also argues this point, stating that the lines between political and 
economic risk are often extremely blurred and that a decision-maker may get the most useful 
results by separating the political factors from the other factors. To conclude, in this research 
study, country risk can be explained as “potential financial losses due to problems arising 
from macro economic events in a country that are uncontrollable yet often inevitable. 
Political risk is more specific, referring to “factors caused by government policy (in)action or 
reaction”, which “can to some extent be managed if not avoided” (Brink, 2004: 175). As this 




2.3.3. Political risk 
In surveying the field of political risk one can begin by noting the diversity of existing 
definitions. Indeed, the use of political risk analysis is not limited to one field and thus the 
term has different connotations depending on whether it is used by international businesses, 
political institutions and organisations, development agencies, or NGOs (Jarvis, 2008: 2-3). 
Moreover, “[t]he nature and scope of political risk changes with respect to the specific time, 
home and host countries, and organizations involved” (Alon et, 2006: 626). What can be said 
with surety is that political risk analysis requires comprehensive knowledge of many different 
areas, including, but not limited to, the effects of politics on economics, international 
relations, law, history, culture, and finance. In order to conduct a valid and reliable political 
risk analysis, selecting relevant risk factors and their indicators from these different areas is 
imperative. Examples of risk indicators include failed states, conflict, external and internal 
border disputes, leadership and succession issues, military and paramilitary activity, and 
foreign policy and relations. Other less obvious indicators are literacy levels, the existence 
and activity of trade unions, and HIV/AIDS.    
 With regard to definition, the term political risk has been used in a broad sense to 
refer to an aggregate of policy, security, and economic risk and also in a narrow sense as an 
organisations’ loss of control or benefits due to government action in a host country (Alon et 
al, 2006: 624, and Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249). Nevertheless, what this research study aims to 
keep in mind in searching for a definition of political risk is Jarvis’ (2008: 1) suggestion that 
“political risk is best approached as a praxis-driven ontology and defined in relation to its 
practical application”. Thus, in searching for a definition, a number of conceptualisations of 
political risk shall be looked at in order to facilitate the development of the type of definition 
desired as the basis for political-security risk.  
 An early definition of political risk can be attributed to Robock (1971: 1) whose 
conceptualisation focuses on “changes” as the central feature of political risk. According to 
Robock (1971: 1), political risk exists when “discontinuities occur in the business 
environment... when they are difficult to anticipate and... when they result from political 
change”, and lastly, these changes must have a potential for “significantly affecting the profit 
or other goals of a particular enterprise”. In the same vein, Kobrin (1979:77) defines political 
risk as “the probability that changes in the political environment will reduce returns to the 
point where the project would be no longer acceptable on the basis of ex ante criteria”. 
Similarly, Howell (2007: 7) defines political risk as “the possibility that political decisions or 
political or social events in a country will affect the business climate in such a way that 
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investors will lose money or not make as much money as they expected when the investment 
was made”. The above definitions all describe political risk from a business and therefore 
profit-centred, perspective. Indeed, the business-oriented perspective dominates the literature 
on political risk, leaving little room for definitions which are inclusive of organisations that 
do not have profit as their raison d’être. A definition of political risk that encompasses 
international agencies, which by nature do not have profit as their central concern, is logically 
desired.  
 With this in mind, Brink (2004: 25) and Simon’s (1982: 68) definitions are turned to. 
Brink’s provides clarity on the origin of political risk in her definition of the term as “the 
probability that interrelated factors caused or influenced by government political decisions, 
(in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen external or internal events will affect business and 
investment climates in a way that investors will lose money or not make as much money as 
they expected when the initial decision to invest was made”. Simon (1982: 68) achieves 
greater specificity regarding micro and macro political risk in his definition of political risk as 
“governmental and societal actions and policies, originating either within or outside the host 
country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of foreign business 
operations and investments”. Simon’s definition also widens the scope of political risk which, 
in the words of Alon and Martin (1998: 11), “is germane to political risk assessment because 
the multinational firm faces political risks from the host country environment, home country 
environment, international environment, and the global environment”. Simon and Brink’s 
definitions, while still focused on the business environment, exhibit a number of 
characteristics that make them relevant, with the addition of a few modifications, for the 
purposes of this research study.  
 Firstly, unlike the conceptualisations of Robock, Kobrin and Howell, who attribute 
political risk to political change or political decisions, Brink (2004: 25) offers greater 
specificity on the origin of political risk as “interrelated factors caused or influenced by 
government political decisions, (in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen external or internal 
events”. Brink also makes a distinction, which is taken further by Simon, between micro risk 
and macro risk (to be discussed in detail later). This distinction is central to this research 
study, which is industry specific, and thus micro in nature. Brink and Simon’s definitions are 
the most comprehensive and detailed of the above definitions as they reflect the key 
components necessary for a praxis-oriented, operational definition. However, they lack the 
feature that enables them to be used as a definition for organisations that do not have profit as 
their central motivation. For the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on the 
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conceptualisation of political risk by Brink (2004: 25) and Simon (1982:68), namely that 
political risk:  
• is caused or influenced by government or societal political decisions, policies, 
(in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen events. 
• can originate either within or outside the host country. 
• will impact either a select group of, or the majority of foreign organisations12. 
• will most likely have a negative effect on organisations. 
 
2.3.4. Industry-specific political risk 
The distinction between macro political risk and industry-specific (micro) political risk is an 
important one to make at this juncture as this research study focuses on industry-specific 
political-security risk analysis. Robock (1971: 9), in his seminal article, defines macro 
political risk as “unanticipated and politically motivated environmental changes... broadly 
directed at all foreign enterprise”. Macro political risks are, therefore, countrywide, affecting 
all organisations in all sectors. Political risk is of an industry-specific nature when the 
“environmental changes are intended to affect only selected fields of business activity or 
foreign enterprises with specific characteristics”. Hence industry-specific political risk only 
affects a particular industry, for example, the international agency industry. Brink (2004: 38) 
similarly distinguishes between the two, stating that “macro risks are those risks that will 
affect all businesses in a specific country, where micro risks will only impact upon a certain 
industry, and not on others at all”.  
 Further, a distinction can be made between the internal and the external dimensions of 
macro political risk. In this regard, the internal causes of macro political risk are generated 
within the country, while the external causes are brought about by the home country, a third 
country, or the global environment (Robock, 1971: 9 and Alon and Martin, 1998: 12). For 
example, an external source of a macro political risk would be the widespread disinvestment 
campaign directed at companies operating in Sudan as a result of the genocidal conflict in 
Darfur that began in approximately 2003. An example of internal macro political risk is 
widespread political unrest that affects all entities operating in the country (Alon and Martin, 
1998: 12).  
 While macro risks are more dramatic in nature, Robock (1971: 10) argues that 
industry-specific risks are more prevalent. Industry-specific political risk is actually the type 
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of risk encountered the most frequently by organisations. The nature and scope of industry-
specific political risk varies from industry to industry with respect to time and the 
organisations involved (Alon et al, 2006: 626). Hence, as Robock notes (1971: 10) “the types 
of business operations with a high vulnerability to micro risk will vary from nation to nation 
and over time in the same nation”. Regarding industry-specific political risks, there are two 
further factors which can affect or compound the risk over time. The first of these is the 
number of foreign organisations operating in a specific industry. The greater the 
preponderance of foreign organisations in a specific industry, the higher political risk is likely 
to be. The second factor concerns the capacity of nationals to operate organisations in a 
specific industry. If a high capacity exists, this tends to correspond with a higher industry-
specific risk in the industry (Robock, 1971: 10).  
 In order to understand the political-security risks associated with a specific venture, 
within a particular industry, industry-specific political risk analysis, which undertakes to 
understand risk from the standpoint of the affected organisation, is the key. Indeed, as Alon et 
al (2006: 627) conclude, “micropolitical risks are much more manageable and thereby more 
practically useful for modern-day companies”. The aspects of industry-specific political risk 
discussed above are essential in formulating a relevant and valid definition of political-
security risk as this study focuses exclusively on industry-specific political-security risk for 
international agencies in conflict zones.  
 
2.3.5. Political-security risk 
With the increased demand for political risk analysis in the context of the 21st century, there 
has been a concurrent expansion of the field into different branches, of which political-
security risk is but one (Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming). As this field has only recently 
become of interest, there is a dearth of detailed literature on the subject, especially with 
respect to definitional parameters. In this regard, Fouché (2003: 18) describes political-
security risk as “those vulnerabilities that flow from political risks (policy responses to 
security threats) that are found in a specific country... these could include amongst others, 
political actions such as unpopular legislations leading to widespread unrest... labour actions 
and even terrorism”. Fouché’s focus is on the political-security elements of conventional 
political risk. While Fouché’s definition is a start, limitations lie in his exclusion of what the 
security elements of political-security risk actually are, and, therefore, what the operational 
parameters of political-security risk are. Fouché (2003: 16-18) does discuss the elements of 
security in his thesis; however, for definitional thoroughness these could be incorporated into 
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his operational definition. Lambrechts et al (Forthcoming) contribute to Fouché’s definition 
as they specify three different levels of security in political-security risk: transnational 
security, national security, and human security. Lambrechts et al (Forthcoming) provide a 
brief overview of the different levels of security within political-security risk. Hence, their 
conceptualisation of political-security risk, which is highly relevant for this research study, 
can be detailed further.  
 In reaching a definition of political-security risk for this research study the above 
elements are taken into consideration. Thus, the levels of political-security risk are expanded 
on first, using Lambrechts et al’s (Forthcoming) conceptualisation of transnational, national, 
and human security as a basis. Thereafter, drawing on this three-pronged definition of 
security, as well as both Fouché (2003) and Lambrechts et al’s (Forthcoming) definitions of 
political-security risk and the definition of political risk reached in the previous section, a 
definition of political-security risk as the foundation of this study will be reached.  
 The end of the Cold War is often thought of as the commencement of an essentially 
different global political economy. This can be detected in the post-Cold War preoccupation 
with security studies and the consequent reconsideration of the term security (Tarry, 1999: 1). 
Indeed, security has come to be defined in terms of traditional vs non-traditional conceptions 
in which the traditionalist perspective is entrenched in Cold War, statist notions of security, 
while non-traditionalist conceptions are much broader and more people-centred. Essentially, 
this is a discussion that encompasses the three levels of security which are, in this research 
study, transnational security, national security and human security (Uzodike and Isike, 2009: 
104 and Tarry, 1999: 1).  
 The transnational and national levels of security fall within the more traditionalist 
perspective of security which is based on the old Westphalian notion of security as the 
prerogative of the state. In this sense, security is viewed from a political realist perspective, 
and thus, security threats mainly originate from the military realm (Tarry, 1999: 2). National 
security includes aspects such as the preservation of state territory against external threat, the 
preservation of constitutional and political order, the promotion of key national values, and 
the preservation of national interests and internal values. Threats to national security can 
originate both externally (for example, insurgency and territorial violations) and internally 
(for example, revolutionary activities, and political discontent) (Mathur, 1996: 233 and 
Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming). Transnational security, on the other hand, focuses on the 
region as the main actor and refers to security factors that will impact actors in the region. 
Examples include border disputes, aggression by neighbouring states and transnational 
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criminal or rebel networks (Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming). Indeed, according to Mathur 
(1996: 233) the security of a state demands an analysis of the “political and security 
environments of the region in which it is located”.  
 The last conception of security is human security which engages with issues that are 
ultimately not included in the definitions of transnational and national security. The concept 
of human security is a post-Cold War development that came about due to the perceived 
failings of the traditionalist perspectives of security. As Tadjbakhsh (2005: 4) writes: “a 
human security approach attempted to transform traditional notions of security, framed in 
terms of national and regional stability and the stability of political and economic systems, 
and to focus on human beings”. Human security therefore refers to the safety of the 
individual as the main actor and is concerned with threats such as violations of human rights, 
political discrimination, and ethnic rivalry. By definition, it can be seen that human security 
accommodates a “wide range of issues that not only constitute threats to human existence, but 
also breed insecurity and societal anarchy” (Uzodike and Isike, 2009: 106).  
 The three levels of security described above are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is 
argued here, as Uzodike and Isike (2009: 107) do, that the three levels of security proposed in 
this research study are mutually reinforcing. This is due to the way in which each level 
contributes in a different and detailed way to ensure a well-rounded and comprehensive 
definition of security. The above conceptualisation of security cannot hope to have 
adequately captured the immense body of literature which exists on the genesis of security 
studies. However, it is hoped that at least, it has allowed a more detailed understanding of the 
division of the term into three levels and why this has been done. It remains then, to bring all 
the pieces of this discussion together in a definition of political-security risk that will be used 
throughout this research study. The definition of political-security risk developed below 
draws upon the definition of political risk posited earlier in this chapter, which is an 
amalgamation of Brink (2004: 25) and Simon’s (1982: 68) definitions. In addition, 
Lambrechts et al’s (Forthcoming) conceptualisation of political-security risk, and the ensuing 
discussion in this section on the meaning of security are used in the development of a 
definition of political-security risk. Thus, political-security risk: 
• consists of interrelated security risks, including transnational, national, and human 
security 
•  is caused or influenced by government or societal political decisions, policies, 
(in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen events. 
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• can originate either within or outside the host country. 
• will impact either a select group of, or the majority of foreign organisations13. 
• will most likely have a negative effect on organisations.  
 
2.3.6. Qualitative vs quantitative political risk analysis 
Erroneously, humans tend to believe quantitative data, which is more tangible, over 
qualitative data, which is more abstract. As Bremmer and Keat (2009: 176) note, people 
“assume that ‘numbers don’t lie’”. Political risk analysis though, relies heavily on qualitative 
methods in which soft variables are used, over quantitative methods in which hard variables 
are used. This is why the field has often tended to be ignored, as translating these risks into 
quantitative terms is often very difficult and even undesirable. Political risk analysis is done 
by collecting data and information and processing it into a “meaningful ‘picture’ of the 
elements and their relation to the host country” (Brink, 2004: 32). In this research study the 
meaningful picture is achieved through an approach which, though relying heavily on 
qualitative methods, also utilises qualitative methods. 
 In this regard, the point can be made that it is not only a qualitative approach that 
utilises numbers or mathematics. Indeed, Brink (2004: 12) shows how “qualitative variables 
can be measured and quantified, by attributing weights to risk factor indicators. These 
weights are then calculated to present a measured, probable chance that political risk might 
occur”. Further, qualitative analysis also tends to be “rich in detail, sensitive to context, and 
capable of showing the complex processes or sequences of social life (Neumann, 2006: 459). 
The problem inherent in quantitative analysis is that the intricacies of social (or political) life 
are difficult to quantify mathematically. Indeed, Brink (2004: 117) notes that political risk is 
not an “actuality that can be measured in terms of probability theory”. In political risk, terms 
such as “likelihood, chances and probability are judgements rather than mathematical 
calculations”. For this reason it can be said that political risk analyses are not ever truly 
quantitative or mathematical and though they may look as such, at a base level they are made 
up of subjective judgements. These judgements reflect the decisions of the analyst, and vary 
from the decision on how to weight certain factors, what factors to include in or exclude from 
the model, and which data and information sources to use. Qualitative analysis is also less 
hampered by the time-consuming nature of quantitative analysis, in which highly technical, 
mathematical, and rigid methods are often used. By virtue of these features, quantitative 
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analyses also tend to be rather static, and therefore more difficult to adapt than qualitative 
analysis to the fast-changing circumstances which often characterise the contexts in which 
political risk analyses are called for. This is not to say that qualitative analysis is fault free; it 
is not. The subjective nature of qualitative analysis means that the underlying biases of the 
analyst can affect the findings. Nevertheless, taking into account the above discussion on the 
merits and means of each method of analysis, this research study makes use of a mixed 
method. Hence, qualitative and quantitative methods are employed in order to develop an 
industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones.  
 
2.3.7. International agencies 
For the sake of brevity, this research study uses the term international agencies to describe 
the organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian, political, technical and 
developmental assistance to governments, civil societies and populations affected by conflict 
(Bruderlein, 2004: 1). The reason why this research study draws on Bruderlein’s (2004: 1) 
conceptualisation is that it makes room for the inclusion of a number of related types of 
organisations that all have similar aims in assisting populations, governments and civil 
societies affected by conflict. Included in this definition are humanitarian organisations, 
NGOs, UN and non-UN agencies, International Red Cross and Red Crescent organisations, 
charitable groups and foundations that “operate internationally, and engage actively in 
conflict environments” (Bruderlein, 2004: 1). The terms, humanitarian organisation, NGO, 
INGO, and charitable organisation are often used interchangeably with the term international 
agency. However, the choice behind the use of this term is due to the fact that it performs an 
umbrella function, encapsulating the similar functions of the above-mentioned terms in single 
definition. Additionally, the similarity of the security challenges confronting the various 
organisations and agencies working in conflict zones is another reason why an umbrella term 
such as international agencies is deemed useful for this research study. For as Bruderlein 
(2004: 1) notes, even though international agencies function under “specific and divergent 
mandates, their staff and activities often face similar security challenges”.  
 This study is focused upon international agencies in conflict zones. However, 
international agencies do function across a much wider spectrum. The majority of NGOs are 
development orientated, operating in order to aid countries in achieving development goals 
such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Stoddard, 2003a: 1). International 
agencies also operate in disaster zones such as that seen in New Orleans after Hurricane 
Katrina. In addition, they function as advocacy organisations to create awareness and change 
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attitudes and beliefs. An example is HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns carried out by 
international agencies in many African countries. Indeed, according to Werker and Ahmed 
(2007: 3), NGOs “pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, 
protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community 
development”. Hence, NGOs, and by definition international agencies, are not solely 
concerned with operating in conflict zones. They function in multiple capacities, under long-
term and short-term mandates, in many and varied settings, from the depths of the conflict-
infested DRC, to the streets of New Orleans in the highly developed US. They work both 
independently and alongside governments. And they range in size, from one person, to 
complex organisations with headquarters in every country in the world (Werker and Ahmed, 
2007: 3).   
 In terms of their structure, international agencies can be nationally orientated, 
internationally orientated, or both. The majority of the world’s NGOs are based in the US and 
Europe, but most of their work is done internationally, in developing countries (Werker and 
Ahmed, 2007: 5). Indeed, the major international agencies include CARE International, 
World Vision, Oxfam, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, Save the Children, Doctors 
Without Borders, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), ECHO, and of course, the UN (Stoddard, 
2003b: 25-26). International agencies such as these are often composed of a number of 
national affiliates, under various forms of confederation. Governance structures within these 
agencies vary depending on their organisational cultures. As Stoddard (2003b: 26) notes, 
some NGO federations began with a strong corporate model and others started out as looser 
umbrella organisations. However, since the 1990s a more confederated style of governance 
has come to characterise organisations, due mainly to the “perceived need for tighter policy 
coherence among national members, and the desire to increase southern participation” 
(Stoddard, 2003b: 26). While the structure and functions of international agencies may differ, 
in conflict zones they face similar security challenges. The conflict zones within which these 
security challenges are located remains to be defined. 
 
2.3.8. Conflict zones 
This research study uses the term conflict zone to refer to both active conflict environments 
and post-conflict environments. Obviously, the role of international agencies in active 
conflict zones is an integral one in terms of providing relief and aid in the form of food, 
shelter and medical attention and supplies to war-stricken populations, among others (Avant 
and Haufler, 2008: 17). The reasoning behind including post-conflict environments in the 
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definition of conflict zones is that a large proportion of international agencies’ work involves 
providing humanitarian, developmental, technical, and political assistance once active 
fighting has subsided. This can be seen in their facilitation of and continual manning of 
refugee camps, their involvement in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
campaigns, their provision of food and medical aid, and their participation in reconstruction 
and development initiatives in war-torn countries.  
 A second reason behind including post-conflict environments in the definition of 
conflict zones is that post-conflict environments often present as great a security risk to 
international agencies as do active conflict environments. Indeed, the signing of a peace 
treaty or the abatement of formal hostilities by no means ensures a safer working 
environment for international agencies. Sources of post-war insecurity include, but are not 
limited to, the persistence of unaddressed root causes of the conflict such as ongoing 
grievances over resources; the difficulties of repatriating land to conflict affected populations, 
the lack of political rights in conflict-stricken zones; the scarcity of post-war opportunities for 
combatants; vested interests in the continuation of violence by certain parties who stand to 
lose social, economic or political power acquired during the conflict; lack of state capacity 
and poor economic growth, which perpetuates the grievances that prompted conflict in the 
first place; the spiralling security dilemma in which vulnerable groups attempt to ensure their 
security vis-a-vis other groups, often leading to localised fighting and even a resumption of 
hostilities; and the return of refugees and IDPs which may reignite hostilities over property 
and entitlement rights (Autesserre, n.d. 2-5). Hence, this research study includes both active 
conflict environments and post-conflict environments in its investigation into the political-
security risks faced by international agencies in conflict zones and the development of a 
political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. Indeed, this research 
study centres on a case study of the conflict zone in eastern Chad, which can be described as 
a combination of an active conflict and post-conflict environment (USAID, 2010: 1). 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter has been to provide a conceptualisation of the key terms 
relevant to this research study, as well to explore the underlying theory of political risk 
analysis that forms the theoretical grounding for this study. The foundations of political risk 
analysis and political-security risk analysis were located in decision-making and problem-
solving theory. Thereafter, core concepts, including, risk, country risk, political risk, industry-
specific risk and political-security risk were examined. Through this process a framework has 
29 
 
been created from which an industry-specific political-security risk model can be developed 
and applied in the following chapters. Chapter three will embark on the task of developing an 
industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies. This will be done by 
first discussing the relationship between international agencies, contemporary conflicts and 
the post-9/11 global political-security environment. Thereafter, the focus will turn to the 




Chapter 3: Industry-specific political-security risk analysis for 
international agencies in conflict zones 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter has as its central focus the development of a political-security risk model 
specific to international agencies operating in conflict zones. Preceding the development of 
this model, a brief analysis of the relationship between international agencies, contemporary 
conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape will illuminate the evolving 
dynamics between political-security risk and international agencies. Thereafter, three political 
risk models specific to the energy industry will be analysed with the aim of highlighting and 
extracting aspects that will aid in the development of an industry-specific political-security 
risk framework for international agencies in conflict zones. The security risk models 
currently used by three prominent international agencies - CARE International, ECHO, and 
the UN - will then be detailed with an eye to identifying the strengths and, more importantly 
for this research study, the limitations that they exhibit. This chapter culminates in the 
development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in 
conflict zones. This will be followed by the presentation of a simple risk grading scale for 
interpreting the model. At the heart of this chapter is the identification of the relevant risk 
factors and indicators that will be included in a political-security risk model for international 
agencies in conflict zones. They will form the crux of the model developed in this study and 
their identification and the way in which they are employed in the model is therefore of the 
utmost salience.  
 
3.2. Political-security risk and international agencies: An evolving relationship 
In assessing the evolving nature of political risk, Brink (2004: 9) notes that the analysis of it 
is “a dynamic subject, as both expected and unexpected events constantly take place against a 
backdrop of shifting trends and sudden occurrences”. The same can be said about political-
security risk, which is by no means a static field. This is especially true when considered in 
relation to international agencies in conflict zones. Indeed, the nature and scope of the 
political-security risk facing international agencies in current times has, in the words of Fast 
(2010: 2), “bought humanitarian security to the front pages”. Incidents that have contributed 
to the headlining of this industry include the 1996 assassination of six International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates sleeping in their beds in Chechnya; the 2003 
suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad; the brutal murder of 17 members of 
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Action Contre le Faim (ACF) in Sri Lanka in 2006; and the ambushes, kidnapping and 
murder of hundreds of aid workers in conflict zones throughout the world (Fast, 2010: 2).  
 Opinions differ on the exact causes underlying the increasing risk experienced by 
international agencies. However, two broad frameworks within which these causes can be 
located are: the nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security 
landscape. It is therefore the aim of this section to provide a broad description of the rising 
political-security risk faced by international agencies. The relevance of this section lies in the 
way in which our understanding of the causes underlying international agency insecurity 
influences our analysis of the political-security risks facing international agencies in conflict 
zones. For as Brink (2004: 26) notes concerning the occurrence and perception of political 
risk, “both internal and external events... are constantly influencing the severity and degree to 
which risk factors influence investment”. In order to develop a political-security risk model 
for international agencies that best represents reality, these underlying factors are integral and 
shall now be considered. 
 
3.2.1. International agencies, contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-
security landscape 
Over the last two decades international agencies have had to contend with the considerable 
diminishment of their humanitarian space – that neutral and independent position from which 
they can assist vulnerable people in times of conflict. In this regard, the intensification of 
globalisation since the 1980s and the simultaneous end of the Cold War can be identified as 
important explanatory factors. Indeed, the shift from a generally polarised global political 
economy to a globalised one has brought about major changes in international relations. It 
has decreased the risk of global confrontation and inter-state conflict, while at the same time 
played a fundamental role in the increasing frequency of low-intensity, intra-state conflict. 
This trend in the nature of conflict has elicited much attention among conflict theorists, not 
least for the way in which the nature of contemporary conflicts impacts and influences peace 
efforts, particularly interventions by international agencies.  
 Of all the terms coming out of the attempts to try to understand and find solutions for 
the chaotic conflicts witnessed in the last few decades, Mary Kaldor’s (2006) “new wars” is 
one of the best known and most contested (Maao, 2010: 2). While the debate over Kaldor’s 
thesis is recognised in this research study, it is not the aim of this section to engage in it, but 
rather to describe the common traits of contemporary conflict. In this regard, elements of 
Kaldor’s (2006) thesis are useful in providing a general description of the nature of current 
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conflicts. Kaldor (2006) argues that current forms of conflict can be contrasted to earlier 
forms of conflict in terms of “their goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed” 
(Kaldor, 2006: 7). She (Kaldor, 2006) posits that in addition to the more traditional forms of 
conflict, which are primarily concerned with competing ideologies, geo-politics and inter-
state rivalries, more amorphous forms of conflict are becoming prevalent. Along with Kaldor 
(2006), other scholars14 have also either used the term “new wars” or pointed towards the 
similar characteristics of contemporary conflicts. These conflicts are characterised by traits 
such as identity politics, terrorism, criminal violence and the development of a globalised war 
economy (Sheehan, 2008: 214 and Runge, 2004: 234). 
  In the first instance, contemporary conflicts are often concerned with “identity politics 
in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier conflicts” (Kaldor, 2006: 7). In 
this sense conflicts are often about claims to power on the basis of a particular identity, such 
as religious or ethnic identity, that is not necessarily connected to that of the state. Secondly, 
the strategies used in contemporary conflicts draw upon “the experience of guerrilla warfare 
and counter-insurgency... as a way of getting round the massive concentrations of military 
force which are characteristic of conventional war” (Kaldor, 2006: 8). Thus territory is 
captured through political control of the population rather than military advance. Further, the 
sowing of fear, hatred and terror through the mobilisation of extremist politics is a defining 
characteristic. Common tactics include mass killings, hostage-taking, recruitment of child 
soldiers, forced resettlement, as well as political, psychological and economic techniques of 
intimidation (Sheehan, 2008: 223). This is why contemporary conflicts have witnessed an 
increasing number of refugees and IDPs, and why most violence has been directed at 
civilians. In fact, distinguishing between perpetrators and civilians in contemporary conflicts 
is typically extremely difficult as the individuals fighting in these wars include a “disparate 
range of different types of groups, such as paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, 
police forces, mercenary groups and also regular armies, including breakaway units from 
regular armies” (Kaldor, 2006: 9).  
 Regarding the financing of contemporary conflicts, perpetrators have come to finance 
fighting through plunder; trafficking of people, weapons and drugs; money laundering; the 
black market; external assistance and through the extortion or theft of foreign aid, rather than 
through taxation which is often used to fund more traditional forms of conflict (Sheehan, 
2008: 223). Moreover, this “globalized war economy” is supported through the proliferation 
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 Scholars include, Sheehan (2008), van Crevald (1991), Duffield (2001), Hoffman and Weiss (2006), Fleming 
(2009), Jung (2003), Gilbert (2003), and Munkler (2005). 
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of advanced modern technology, such as cell phones, computers, and small arms and light 
weaponry, which all aid in the coordination, mediation and negotiation of fighting units 
(Kaldor, 2006: 9). Essentially, the conflicts that we are witnessing today are not clear-cut. 
They consist of myriad elements that are not easily distinguishable or quantifiable from the 
outside. Over and above the evolution in conflict dynamics, the tumultuous occasion of 9/11 
has had a profound effect on shaping the global political-security landscape.  
 The event of 9/11 and its aftermath have served to compound the trends seen in 
conflict dynamics. 9/11 has contributed to a renewed polarisation and radicalisation of 
conflict environments (Krahenbuhl, 2004: 505). This can be seen in the discourse that has 
emerged around the ‘war on terror’, which has forced individuals, societies, and states, alike, 
to choose sides. The prime illustration of this can be found in President George Bush’s 
address to the US Congress in September 2001, in which he stated: “Either you are with us, 
or you are with the terrorists” (quoted in Mills, 2005: 1). Polarisation is also apparent in the 
re-emergence of tensions between the so-called global North and the global South, which is 
also framed as a conflict between the West vs the Rest or Islam vs Christianity (Krahenbuhl, 
2004: 505). And while the local causes of conflict, documented above, remain pervasive, 
“[t]actics concerned with the ‘fight against terrorism’, including acts of indiscriminate 
violence perpetrated by non-State entities and the spread of repressive policies in individual 
States, are at present much more in evidence” (Krahenbuhl, 2004: 506). This raises the issue 
of increased radicalisation post-9/11.  
 Radicalisation can be observed in the strategy of pre-emption through which the Bush 
administration and its allies responded to 9/11 and which has had major repercussions 
throughout world, both on international relations and on international humanitarian 
interventions. The call to pre-emptive action by the US represented a harsh response to a 
radical terrorist attack (Mills, 2005: 47). The existence of so-called failed states and the 
potential threat they pose to US, and Western interests has, since 9/11, provided the rationale 
for large-scale interventions premised on the desire to make the world a more peaceful and 
secure place. The global political-security environment that this type of strategy has fostered 
is one in which the lines between morality and self-interest have become blurred. As a result, 
it has become difficult to distinguish whether current interventions are based on pecuniary 
motivations or on creating a more peaceful global environment.  
 In sum, both the changing nature of conflict and the effects of 9/11 on the global 
political-security environment have played a key role in the increased exposure of 
international agencies to risk and insecurity. In this regard, four aspects are prominent. 
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Firstly, the blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians and the active 
targeting of civilians that characterises contemporary conflict zones means that international 
agencies, as supporters of the victims of conflict, are no longer regarded as neutral parties to 
the conflict (Runge, 2004: 234). Moreover, since a significant role of international agencies is 
to transfer scarce resources (which are highly valued by warring parties) to needy 
populations, aid has gained an important strategic role in conflict zones (Runge, 2004: 234). 
International agencies have thus come to be viewed as actors in the conflict and therefore as 
legitimate targets for warring parties. Secondly, there is the growing perception of 
international agencies as instruments of state’s foreign policy and strategy (NGO Voice, 
2009). Indeed, states are using aid campaigns in order to garner support for military actions. 
This has contributed to the perception of international agencies as Western institutions, and 
since the religiously charged event of 9/11, as institutions with a Christian-Western agenda. 
Thirdly, there is the increasingly explicit linkage of the security/military agenda and the 
humanitarian agenda. Since 9/11 and the shift towards greater interventionism, the 
humanitarian job traditionally reserved for international agencies has been increasingly 
undertaken by the military. Thus, due to the blurring of the distinction between the military 
and the humanitarian, international agencies are seen as legitimate targets in a conflict zone. 
They therefore face increasingly serious security risks, the likes of which are usually reserved 
for military actors who have the capacity and mandate to deal with such risks. Lastly, with 
the increasing non-compliance by warring parties to international humanitarian law and the 
accompanying culture of impunity characterising conflict zones, international agencies are 
often seen as competitors and as obstacles to the control of local populations by warring 
parties. The proliferation of international agencies over the last two decades in order to deal 
with the diverse aspects of contemporary conflicts has not helped this situation as it has 
engendered an increased exposure to security risks (Bruderlein, 2004: 3).  
 The causes of increasing international agency insecurity have been located within two 
related frameworks: the nature of contemporary conflict and the post-9/11 global political-
security environment. It can be concluded that the sources of security risk are multifarious 
and that the types of insecurity that international agencies face today are a direct consequence 
of global developments. Indeed, as Bruderlein (2004: 1) aptly notes: “Many organizations... 
fail to acknowledge the changing perceptions of international assistance in some areas of the 
world and the changing profile of the security threats that endanger not only their operators 
but the recipient communities as well”. In order to develop a political-security risk model for 
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international agencies in conflict zones, the importance of understanding the origin of 
political-security threats cannot be understated. 
  
3.3. From political risk to political-security risk – towards a model 
Venter (1997: 6) writes that “[p]olitical risk events are discontinuous; in other words they are 
not predictable on the basis of statistically based generalisation – the events are too few and 
too disparate – to be the subject of such generalisations. But a fundamental descriptive 
analysis of political and social trends in a state can provide decision-makers with early 
warning signals of impending political risks”. The development in this section, of a political-
security risk model specific to international agencies in conflict zones aims to provide a tool 
for industry employees that allows them to undertake the continuous descriptive analysis that 
Venter (1997) calls for. The problem for international agencies is that political-security risks 
are difficult for agencies to anticipate successfully. As Venter (1997: 5) notes about political 
risk in the tobacco industry, the same can be said for international agencies, that “[a] war, a 
civil uprising, a terrorist bomb attack on government installations and so on cannot be put 
under management control or even industry-wide control. But such events can and should be 
anticipated in the management operations of companies”. Anticipation of events is preceded 
by a model that accurately captures both the factors and indicators that are pertinent to the 
particular industry. It is to the development of such a model that this research study now 
turns. 
 
3.3.1. Political risk models specific to the energy industry 
Howell (2007: 11) notes that “[i]n designing a model, the relationship between abstract 
concepts, such as authoritarianism, and acts of damage to the investor need to be grounded in 
social science and research”. Further, he (Howell, 2007: 11) states that a “variety of 
approaches have been put forth by corporate analysts and by political organizations in their 
efforts to describe the circumstances of incipient loss”. In this section, three political risk 
frameworks specific to the energy industry are examined, including British Petroleum’s (BP) 
model, the IHS Energy Group’s model, and Boshoff’s15(2010) model.  
 At a general level models from the energy industry are examined because this 
industry has a long history in the analysis of political risk (Alon et al, 2006). Therefore, 
                                                           
15
 Marc Boshoff’s (2010) MA thesis is titled “Investing in Troubled Territories. The Oil and Gas Industry in the 
Ogaden in Eastern Ethiopia: An Increasing Risk to Foreign Investment”. An integral component of his (Boshoff, 
2010) thesis is the development of a comprehensive political risk model for oil and gas companies. 
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invaluable insight can be gained with regard to time-tested methodologies and approaches 
towards model development, which can enhance the relatively under-researched field of 
international agency political-security risk analysis. A second general reason for examining 
three models from this industry is that each one makes use of a unique approach to political 
risk analysis. This means that wide-ranging insights can be gained. These insights will 
contribute to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model that is both 
comprehensive in its approach and detailed in its analysis.  
 At a more specific level, the energy sector is, in many ways, similar to the 
international agency sector. Energy operations are described as the “‘most sensitive of all 
international corporate activities’ because the resources involved are a country’s ‘national 
patrimony’, and such projects can impact a country more than other activities through the 
attendant wealth, international prestige, and power” (Alon et al, 2006: 631 quoting Moran, 
1998: 70). Likewise, international agencies are involved in sensitive, often highly 
controversial conflict situations which are usually highly publicised and involve numerous 
international actors and interests. Moreover, in both industries, organisations are willing to 
accept a high degree of risk. For companies in the energy sector this is due to the fact that the 
benefits of operating in a high-risk environment outweigh the risks (Boshoff, 2010: 1). For 
international agencies, it is essential to their nature that that they operate in conflict zones, 
providing assistance to needy populations. Due to the fact that both energy companies and 
international agencies operate in high-risk, high-probability environments, international 
agencies can apply many of the precepts used by the energy industry in their political risk 
models, to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model. 
 
3.3.1.1. BP’s model   
While BP’s model is not fully available to the public, it is possible to view the company’s 
approach to risk management through the perspective of its operational security as Alon et al 
(2006: 633) do. For BP, risk assessment is a continuous process in which the “preliminary 
assessment sets the stage for operational decisions going forward, and periodic reassessments 
update the initial risk profile” (Alon et al, 2006: 633). BP focuses on successfully managing 
security risk, which is for them the greatest political risk associated with their operations. In 
order to deal with the volatile security environments within which it operates, BP has adopted 
certain security practices. The company has an internal security system in place, with 
specialists hired as consultants from different areas of security, including the police force, 
army, foreign offices, and even civilians. Additionally, BP’s security policy is tailored 
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according to the local requirements in a particular nation or situation. Here, specific emphasis 
is placed on “identifying threats and risks to operations on behalf of the business, helping 
businesses prioritize responses to threats, protecting information..., audits and investigation, 
contingency planning, organizing security exercises”. Moreover, the security network formed 
by the above approach, acts as a “semi-formal forum, making sure its own specialist areas 
interlock and security works smoothly together with other disciplines” (Knott, 1997: 32). 
Attributes of BP’s model relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-
security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones are: 
• Intelligence obtained from different areas of security - police force/ 
army/military: Aside from being valuable intelligence sources regarding security in 
conflict zones, it is important to include security forces as indicators under national 
political-security risk. In this regard, the composition, ability and stability of forces, 
existence of special units, populace’s attitude towards security forces, and the attitude 
of security forces to international agencies all need to be taken into account.  
• Highlights the importance of ongoing situational risk analyses: This attribute is 
imperative for international agencies operating in conflict zones where the possibility 
of regular situational change is high. This implies a need for a political-security risk 
model that is easily adaptable and user-friendly.  
• Stresses the imperative of consulting numerous actors and sources in 
formulating a risk analysis: For international agencies in conflict zones, it is 
important that political-security risk analyses are based on information gleaned from 
numerous actors and sources, at a local, national, regional and international level. The 
security situation in a conflict zone is difficult to predict and accurate analysis is 
often obscured by a lack of reliable information. In order to conduct a political risk 
assessment that is as objective, comprehensive and accurate as possible, as many 
sources as possible need to be consulted.  
• Risk analysis is uniquely tailored for the local requirements of a given operating 
situation: In terms of operating in conflict zones, where circumstances are highly 
context-specific, this is an important point to keep in mind in order to develop a 
model that can be used in extremely divergent situations and still provide a 





3.3.1.2. The IHS Energy Group’s model 
The IHS Energy Group’s model provides a focused industry-specific analysis in which a 
comprehensive index to measure political risk is used (Howell, 2007: 373). The model is 
made up of three major risk factors: political, economic, and commercial petroleum. Each of 
these risks is further sub-classified, resulting in eleven distinct indicators. The host country is 
then ranked on a scale of 1 to 5 for each of these variables, with 0 being risk free and 5 
signifying maximum risk potential. Weights are also assigned to each of the variables and the 
rating for each variable is then multiplied by its weight. Thereafter, the sum of the weighted 
ratings is then divided by 11 to give an overall rating for the country in terms of its risk 
potential. The 11 variables are (weighting in brackets), war and external threats (6%), civil 
and labour unrest (15%), internal violence (21%), regime instability (18%), economic 
instability (5%), energy vulnerability (4%), environmental activism (6%), ethno-linguistic 
factionalism (5%), investment constraints (7%), repatriation restrictions (5%), and threat of 
adverse changes in contracts/fiscal terms (8%). The IHS model is a qualitative model, despite 
the fact that the different variables of political risk are quantified. This is due to the ability of 
the analyst to assign different weights and scores to the variables (Alon et al, 2006: 634). 
According to Alon et al (2006: 634) the IHS index “offers easy quantification of the different 
variables of political risk”. Attributes of the IHS Energy Group’s model relevant to the 
development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in 
conflict zones are: 
• War and external threats variable: For international agencies operating in conflict 
zones the existence of inter-state war and external threats are integral indicators to be 
included under transnational political-security risk. International agencies need to 
take the following variables into account: regional/neighbouring state relationships, 
existence of rebel/terrorist/insurgent/bandit groups from neighbouring states, 
transnational organised crime networks, and neighbouring state’s policies and actions 
affecting international agencies.  
• Internal violence variable: This variable corresponds with both national political-
security risk and human political-security risk. In relation to national political-
security risk, important indicators are the existence of insurgent/rebel/bandit/terrorist 
groups. With regard to human political-security risk, in a conflict zone where violence 




violence/shooting should be included in a political-security risk analysis. 
•  Threat of adverse changes in contracts/fiscal terms: This variable is related to 
national political-security risk. Changes in government policies and actions may 
impact on international agencies’ security and status in a particular conflict zone  
• Breaks risks down into groups and then assigns certain ratings and weights to 
each of the variables: This “forces users to contemplate the configuration of 
circumstances surrounding a particular investment”, thereby contributing to a 
comprehensive political risk analysis (Howell, 2007: 378). Additionally, a numerical 
overall political risk rating is attained through the use of a weighting system that does 
not rely on complex or time-consuming mathematical calculations. 
 
3.3.1.3. Boshoff’s model 
Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model for the oil and gas industry is a “regional level industry-
specific model... which takes on board both macro and micro indicators, which emanate from 
both the internal and external dimension” (Boshoff, 2010: 52). Boshoff’s (2010) model is 
comprised of two phases. Phase one is entitled “host country political risk”, and can be 
completed without knowledge of the investor. In this phase, the factors analysed are: political, 
economic, societal, and petroleum. Phase two consists of two types of political risk: 
“company political risk” and “international political risk”. Phase two can only be completed 
with knowledge of the investor (Boshoff, 2010: 53). In this model, each of the factors is given 
a percentage weight (of a total of a 100% combined). Thereafter, a score of 0 to 5 (0 – no 
risk, 5 – extreme risk) is awarded to each of the factor indicators. The sum of each factor’s 
indicators is added together to give a total score for the factor, which is then multiplied by the 
percentage weight assigned to that factor and then divided by the highest possible score of the 
factor. When all the factors’ scores are added together, a final total score is achieved for the 
country or region under examination.16 Boshoff (2010: 58) also provides a simple risk-
grading scale through which the total score for the country or region under examination can 
be interpreted. Attributes of Boshoff’s model relevant to the development of an industry-
specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones are: 
• Two-phase model: A two-phase model facilitates an industry-specific analysis and 
an agency-specific analysis, depending on whether the analyst is part of a specific 
                                                           
16
 See Appendix B: List of factors and indicators in Boshoff’s model. 
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company or not. Accounting for agency-specific risks facilitates a comprehensive risk 
analysis.  
• Regime/political stability: These indicators correspond with national political-
security risk. Indicators include riots, violent outbursts and revolutions all of which 
impact on the security of international agencies by changing the nature of the conflict 
environment within which they are operating. 
• Corruption/poor governance: These indicators correspond with national political-
security risk. Corruption is an important indicator to take into account for 
international agencies in conflict zones as it can potentially lead to breaches in 
security, contracts and agreements.  
• Homogeneity, ethnic conflict: These indicators correspond with national political-
security risk. Ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious, gender and national divisions in the 
host country/conflict zone are important to consider when operating in a conflict zone, 
due to the fact that some agency employees may face increased security risks based 
on these aspects.  
• Standard of living: This indicator corresponds with national political-security risk. 
Poor or deteriorating living standards of combatants, refugees, and others, in a 
conflict zone affects the security of international agencies as it may lead to increased 
attacks. 
• Nationality of company and host/home government relations: These are 
international agency-specific indicators and thus can only be assessed with knowledge 
of the international agency. Indicators that are also important for international 
agencies include their religious, political and ideological affiliations as well as their 
history the in host country, and internal agency culture.  
• Mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods used: Similar to IHS, Boshoff’s 
model relies on mixed methods and the use of a simple weighting system to attain an 
overall political risk rating, which is easily calculable and understandable. 
• Scale for investment and political risk indication: Boshoff’s risk-grading 
mechanism allows for the easy interpretation of his risk model. Similarly, for 
international agencies, a simple and efficient grading scale through which the 
industry-specific political-security risk model can be interpreted is desired. 
In sum, this section has reviewed three political risk models specific to the energy industry. It 
has been shown that much can be taken from these models in terms of industry-specific ideas 
41 
 
and attributes that will aid in the formulation of an industry-specific political-security risk 
framework for international agencies in conflict zones. Specifically, the precepts in Table 1: 
Summary of the relevant attributes of political risk models specific to the energy industry will 
be used in the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for 
international agencies. 
Summary of the relevant attributes of political risk models specific to the energy industry 
 BP IHS Boshoff 
Methodological 
attributes 
Perform ongoing situational 
risk analysis 
Break risks down into logical 
groups and assign ratings to 
the variables 
Two-phase model – with, or 
without knowledge of 
organisation 
Consult numerous sources in 
formulating a risk analysis 
Simple risk quantification 
through weighting system Mixed methods  
Tailor analysis for the local 
















relationships; policies and 
actions of neighbouring states; 







Police /military composition, 
stability, and ability; special 
units; populace’s attitude 
towards them; relationship 
with international agencies 
Civil war; existence of 
insurgent/terrorist/ bandit/ 
rebel groups 
Homogeneity of society: 
ethnic, racial , linguistic, 
gender, religious, and 
national divisions 
  
Regime type; political 
stability; corruption; local 
attitudes to government; 




Changes in host-government 
policies and actions 
Standard of living of 












Other   
Agency-specific indicators 
are the nationality of 
international agency; home/ 








3.3.2. International agencies’ security risk models 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the security risk models currently used by three 
prominent international agencies, namely, CARE International, ECHO and the UN. In this 
regard, each agency’s approach to security risk assessment will be detailed, with a subsequent 
evaluation of the strengths and more importantly, the limitations, of the models. Focus will 
also be placed on the security risk factors and indicators deemed significant by these 
international agencies. This will aid in the identification of relevant risk factors and indicators 
to be included in the industry-specific political-security risk analysis framework developed 
later in this chapter. 
  
3.3.2.1. CARE International’s model 
CARE International is a humanitarian organisation with a central focus on the delivery of 
emergency aid to survivors in war zones (CARE International, 2010). CARE International’s 
Safety & Security Handbook written by the director of the CARE Security Unity, Bob 
Macpherson, is designed to “assist in improving the safety and security of CARE staff” and 
provides “general precautions and procedures” in this regard (Macpherson, 2004). CARE’s 
handbook is aimed at multiple organisational levels within the CARE system, from staff 
members in the field, to those in country offices, and those at a policy-making level 
(Macpherson, 2004: 10). CARE International’s safety and security assessment is a process 
that includes “an analysis of threats to CARE staff and property, the identification of 
vulnerabilities to these threats, and the development of threat indicators and thresholds to 
monitor changes in the security environment”. Safety and security assessment results are used 
to establish “overall risk levels for the country or area and to make informed decisions about 
which safety and security measures to adopt” (Macpherson, 2004: 9). 
 The first step in a safety and security assessment is an analysis of threats, defined as 
the “possibility that someone or something can injure staff or steal or damage CARE assets”. 
In the process of threat analysis, seven operating contexts are considered in terms of the 
threat factors that they could create. Operating contexts are, namely: geography, climate, 
political and economic, infrastructure, traditions, beliefs, customs and religious dynamics, 
social, and current security practices. With regard to types of threats, CARE stipulates three 
main types: crime (“performed through malicious, financial or personal motivation”); direct 
threats (“where CARE staff or property are the intended target”); and indirect threats (“where 
CARE is not the intended target”) (Macpherson, 2004: 11). Thereafter, an analysis of threat 
patterns and trends, including the location, frequency and intensity of each identified threat is 
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conducted. The next step in threat analysis involves determining the impact of each threat on 
staff and programming. CARE recommends scenario development in this regard. Once 
pattern, trend and impact are known for each threat, threat levels must then be determined 
(e.g. low, moderate, high or severe). The output of a threat analysis is “a list of possible 
threats with corresponding levels as well as a narrative discussion of the specific factors 
considered in determining each level” (Macpherson, 2004: 12).  
 The next aspect of the safety and security assessment process is a vulnerability 
analysis, defined as “the likelihood of encountering threatening incidents and having them 
result in harm to staff or loss of property” (Macpherson, 2004: 13). The following issues are 
considered when analysing vulnerabilities, namely: “why are staff and assets vulnerable?; 
“who or what are most vulnerable?”; “where are staff and assets most vulnerable?”; and, 
“when are staff and assets most vulnerable?” The handbook then stipulates that the same 
tools used to analyse threats can be used to analyse vulnerabilities. Further, with regard to 
indicators it is stated that “certain events may indicate changes in the safety or security 
environment, which could then suggest possible modification in safety and security 
measures”. These “indicators” should be identified during the assessment process, and should 
be observed on a daily basis in order to detect changes (Macpherson, 2004: 15).  
 In order to complete the security assessment, security thresholds should be identified 
for the particular operating area(s). A security threshold is “a readily identifiable ‘trigger’ 
event that, when it occurs, automatically brings about changes in... security measures” and it 
is usually closely linked to threat indicators (Macpherson, 2004: 15). The safety and security 
assessment process allows the determination of the level of risk in a given area or country. In 
this regard, risk ratings are based on the “presence of threats, the vulnerability of the staff to a 
specific threat, and the effectiveness of any safety and security measures already in place” 
(Macpherson, 2004: 16). Risk ratings are defined in the Safety & Security Handbook 
(Macpherson, 2004: 17) and are ranked on a scale, namely: low, moderate, high, and severe. 
Attributes of CARE International’s safety and security assessment framework that are 
relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for 
international agencies in conflict zones include: 
• Comprehensive background analysis of operating context is required: This is 
highly relevant for international agencies in conflict zones due to the fact that in order 
to identify industry-specific political-security risks, comprehensive background or 




Limitations of CARE International’s safety and security assessment framework: 
• Unstructured and therefore vague: CARE International’s safety and security 
assessment process is detailed in writing only, and not illustrated conceptually or 
methodologically in a framework or model. This contributes to the process appearing 
unstructured and vague. As a result, it is also difficult to follow. A model 
encapsulating CARE International’s safety and security assessment process would 
make it more user-friendly, and provide greater clarity and direction with regard to a 
systematic security risk assessment. 
• Risk factors are not detailed: While factors and indicators are listed with regard to 
analysing the general operating context, this is not done with regard to threat factors 
and indicators at the industry-specific level of operations. This means that the 
industry-specific nature of the assessment may be compromised. Indeed the threats 
analysed are based upon the analysts’ discretion, leaving room for subjectivity and 
gaps in the risk assessment.  
 
3.3.2.2. The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid’s model 
 ECHO is the body of the European Union (EU)(Member States and the Commission) 
responsible for the provision of humanitarian aid. ECHO’s mandate is to provide emergency 
assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict, outside the EU. 
ECHO has approximately 200 partners and it is to these partners and affiliated organisations 
that its Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organisations is directed. The Generic 
Security Guide for Humanitarian Organisations aims to help humanitarian organisations to 
manage their security well by “offering suggested guidance, tools and resources, designed to 
assists organisations to think through their security policies and procedures”. The primary 
intended audience of the guide is those responsible for the security management of 
humanitarian organisations, as well as field-based humanitarian managers and workers, 
visitors to the field and managers at headquarters (ECHO, 2007: 6).  
 With regard to security assessment, ECHO’s framework aims to enable humanitarian 
organisations to understand the security situation sufficiently so that they can plan their 
security measures appropriately (ECHO. 2007: 101). With regard to structure, ECHO advises 
that the following aspects are included in a security risk assessment: “location, date, and 
author; general situation; local authorities; threats (list of threats, the likelihood of each threat 
occurring, the likely impact of each threat if it occurred; our vulnerabilities to the threats; 
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security measures needed to minimise those vulnerabilities; what liaisons will be required 
with other organisations; conclusion (does the likely benefit of our work outweigh the 
security risk?, will the organisation’s presence endanger others?); recommendations”. In 
order to calculate security risks, ECHO advises that when considering “threats” in the 
security assessment, one can plot the “relative likelihood, and their impact if they occurred... 
on a chart” (ECHO, 2007: 141). Further, ECHO stipulates that one should rate threats and 
vulnerabilities on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being very low and 5 being very high or catastrophic). 
On the “Threat Impact Chart” (see Figure 1), taken from The Generic Security Guide for 
Humanitarian Organisations (ECHO, 2007: 142), the curved lines represent thresholds of 
risk. The threshold of acceptable risk “varies according to what you expect to achieve”. 
Accordingly, if threats lie beyond the threshold of acceptable risk (which is determined by 
managers), action is required either to remove the threat, or to remove staff from the threat 
(ECHO, 2007: 142).  
 
Figure 1: “Threat impact chart” (ECHO, 2007: 142) 
Attributes of ECHO’s security risk assessment framework relevant to the development of an 
industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones: 
• Local attitudes, local authorities, and security forces: These indicators correspond 
with national political-security risk. These are all indicators that need to be 
considered in relation to international agencies in conflict zones.  
• Easy to use as it does not require complex calculations.  
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Limitations of ECHO’s security risk assessment framework: 
• Risk factors are poorly defined: For example, the factor, “threats”, is only 
accompanied by a list of possible questions that, according to ECHO (2007: 102), 
the person doing the assessment will want answered. These questions appear random 
and there is no indication of why and how they were selected as relevant. There is 
also no indication of which threat indicators should be assessed as part of a routine 
security assessment either and this choice is left to the analyst. The security risk 
assessment relies heavily on the input of the analyst in terms of the indicators 
included for each factor, contributing to a highly subjective assessment. Lastly, 
threats are not logically classified into groups or levels, making a systematic 
assessment difficult. 
• The “Threat Impact Chart” does not result in a comprehensive security risk 
assessment as the analyst can only analyse one threat at a time in order to gauge 
where it lies in relation to the acceptable threshold of risk: In this sense it is 
overly simplistic and as a result it is incapable of providing an indication of the 
general level of security risk faced by an international agency in a conflict zone.  
• Impact scale (very low to catastrophic) and probability scale (very low to very 
high) on risk matrix are not accompanied by definitions of each level: The 
difference between a “high” likely impact of an event and a “catastrophic” likely 
impact of an event is not made clear. 
 
3.3.2.3. The United Nations’ model 
The Security Risk Management (SRM) model is the managerial tool of the UN for the 
analysis of safety and security threats that may affect its personnel, assets and operations in 
conflict zones and other contexts. The Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is an integral part of 
the SRM process. All security decisions, security planning and implementation of security 
measures to manage security must be based on a thorough SRA (UN, 2008: 51). The SRM 
process consists of 8 stages, of which the first 5 make up the SRA: programme assessment; 
threat assessment; vulnerability assessment; risk analysis; selection of options; decision 
making; implementation and monitoring/review. The threat, vulnerability, and programme 
assessment stages incorporate the collection and deduction of relevant information required 
to determine risk. During the risk analysis stage, decisions are made based on the deductions 
provided from the assessments. Accordingly, “this is the most critical stage as it is here that 
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the level of risk, its acceptability, and the possible mitigation factors are determined” (UN, 
2004: 14). The SRA can be conducted at the deep field, country, and headquarters levels. 
 Specifically, with regard to the components of the SRA, threat assessment provides 
both a general and a specific view of the operating environment, together with the 
identification of those threats that may impact the UN and its operations. Threat assessment 
consists of two parts: situation analysis and determination of threats. In the situational 
analysis, information is gathered from a “wide variety of sources such as United Nations 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, diplomatic missions, the host government, 
security forces, local populations and the media” (UN, 2004: 4). This information is grouped 
under several factors, namely: “social, economic, political, infrastructure, and security 
forces”. Secondly, in the determination of threats, all activities, circumstances, events, 
persons and actions that may have an adverse effect on the UN system, staff, facilities, or 
equipment, are considered. Threats are divided into 4 general types: perceived threats, actual 
threats, direct threats, and indirect threats. Vulnerability assessment also consists of two 
parts: determine vulnerabilities (weaknesses) and determine mitigating factors (strengths). 
Vulnerabilities or gaps in existing security arrangements are compared against mitigating 
factors, which are those factors that may lessen the impact of a threat (UN, 2004: 4). 
Programme assessment is an evaluation of “the relevance, urgency, needs and 
implementation methodology” of the UN activities in a particular environment. The 
programme should be assessed against the threats, vulnerabilities and risks on a continual 
basis (UN, 2004: 5). Risk analysis combines all the factors and deductions from the 
assessments and determines the possible impact on the UN, together with the likelihood that 
the particular adverse event will occur (UN, 2004: 5).  
 In a matrix format similar to ECHO’s, the UN grades “impact” and “likelihood” on a 
matrix-style graph. The UN (2004: 6-10) also provides definitions of the descriptors17 for 
“impact”, “likelihood” and “level of risk”. The last step in the SRA is selecting options. This 
process involves determining what course of action, or options, are possible to maintain the 
safety and security of the UN, its staff, and property (UN, 2004: 7). Attributes of the UN’s 
SRA framework relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk 
analysis for international agencies in conflict zones: 
• The threat assessment component of SRA calls for a situational analysis, which 
results in a detailed review of the complete operating, living and security 
                                                           
17
 See Appendix C: UN definitions of descriptors, namely: Table 5: UN definitions of ‘impact’ descriptors, 
Table 6: UN definitions of ‘likelihood’ descriptors, and Table 7: UN definitions of ‘level of risk’ descriptors. 
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environment, including the following variables: political, economic, social, 
infrastructure, and security forces – military and police (UN, 2004: 4): Detailed 
knowledge of the general situation in the context of operations is vital for the 
development of a comprehensive political-security risk analysis for international 
agencies in conflict zones. 
• Detailed descriptions of the rankings of “impact”, “likelihood”, and “level of 
risk” are provided: Regarding a political-security risk analysis model for 
international agencies in conflict zones, the development of a simple and clearly 
defined risk-grading scale enables an efficient analysis to be completed. 
Limitations of the UN’s SRA framework: 
• Does not provide suggestions of what risks factors and indicators the analyst 
could/should consider in SRA: This may result in gaps in the SRA due to the fact 
that, unintentionally, the analyst might not consider certain factors and indicators. It 
also means that the eventual SRA is highly subjective, as it is a reflection of what the 
analyst deems important.  
• Risk matrix only allows one threat to be plotted on it at a time: This does not 
allow for a general level of risk to be ascertained as only the relative risk of a 
particular threat over time can be determined from the matrix.  
• The SRA process is “complex... and its implementation needs to be strengthened 
and improved” (UN, 2008: 51): The SRA process could be made less complex 
through streamlining its multiple component parts into a more inclusive framework. 
In sum, this section has described and analysed three security risk models currently used by 
international agencies. The focus was on identifying the limitations exhibited by these models 
so that an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in which 
these limitations are overcome can be developed later in this chapter. Secondary to 
identifying limitations, attributes of these models that are relevant to the development of an 
industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies were also discussed. 
The limitations and the relevant attributes of international agencies’ current security risk 
models are captured in Table 2: Summary of the relevant attributes and limitations of 






Summary of the relevant attributes and limitations of international agencies’ security risk models 




analysis is required 
National security variables: local 
attitudes, local authorities, and 
security forces 
Situational analysis of general 
operating environment is 
required 
 
Easy to use and no complex 
calculations 
Detailed description of rankings 




therefore, vague Risk factors are poorly defined 
Risk factors and variables not 
specified 
Risk factors and 
variables are not 
detailed 
Only one threat can be plotted 
on threat impact chart at a time 
Only one threat can be plotted 
on risk matrix at a time 
 
Impact and probability scales 
are not defined SRA process is complex 
Table 2: Summary of the relevant attributes and limitations of international agencies’ 
security risk models 
 
3.4. Step one and step two political-security risk analysis 
According to Lax (1983: 113-114): “It is the role of the model... to refine the list and organise 
the variables – their relationships, flows, and consequences, into a useful analytical tool”. The 
above section has identified factors, indicators and methodologies relevant to the 
development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in 
conflict zones. It is to the development of a model through which a successful industry-
specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones can be 
achieved, that this research study now turns. This will be done by first outlining the general 
process of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. In this 
regard Figure 2 illustrates this two-step process, while Figure 3 is more detailed, outlining 
political-risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. 
Figure 2: The two steps of political-security risk analysis specific to international 




STEP TWO (USE MODEL):
Industry-specific political-
security risk analysis for 




Step one involves a conflict analysis, whereby the analyst establishes a basis from which the 
political-security risk model specific to international agencies in conflict zones can be applied 
in step two. The rationale for a two-step process lies in the importance of the analyst having 
an in-depth understanding of the conflict zone in which the international agency will be 
operating. Indeed, both the UN (2004: 4) and CARE International (Macpherson, 2004: 10) 
highlight the value of analysts having a detailed descriptive understanding of their operating 
contexts. Step one therefore, facilitates this understanding as it calls for a conflict analysis in 
which both the origin and the drivers of the conflict are described.  
 Thereafter, step two can be embarked upon. Through the use of the model in step two, 
a political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones is completed. The 
model encompasses four political-security risks with their corresponding factors (factors in 
brackets): transnational political-security risk (transnational risk factor), national political-
security risk (political risk factor, military/police risk factor, internal conflict risk factor, 
societal risk factor), human political-security risk (human risk factor), international agency-
specific political-security risk (home/host country relations risk factor, affiliations risk 
factor). The indicators corresponding to these factors are too numerous to be listed in the 
simple graphical representation in Figure 3. In this regard, the following sub-section will 
further detail the factors and indicators that comprise the two steps of a political-security risk 
analysis specific to international agencies in conflict zones. Thereafter, the complete model 
associated with the factors and indicators will be presented in the form of an industry-specific 





 Figure 3: Outline of industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international 
agencies in conflict zones 
 
3.4.1. Step one: Conflict analysis 
A conflict analysis is the first step in a political-security risk analysis for international 
agencies in conflict zones. In this respect it is necessary for the analyst to have a thorough 
Conflict 
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knowledge of both the origin and drivers of the conflict within which it is operating. Indeed, 
the UN (2004: 4) and CARE International (Macpherson, 2004: 10) highlight this necessity, 
while Gassmann (2005: 3) notes that “[m]ost agencies admit that they have insufficient 
knowledge of the context in which they operate”. CARE International (2004: 10) refers to the 
need for a “good knowledge of the operating context”, while the UN (2004: 3) terms it a 
“situational analysis”. This step ensures that analysts have a background understanding of the 
conflict zone in which they are operating as well as knowledge of the causes motivating the 
particular conflict. Detailed knowledge of these aspects aids in the informed identification of 
political-security risks faced by international agencies when using the model in step two. The 
following variables comprise an analysis of the origin and drivers of a conflict: 
• Origin of Conflict: History of the region in relation to the conflict, history of the 
country in relation to the conflict, and history of the conflict.  
• Drivers of Conflict: Political, economic or pecuniary, social, and ideological 
factors that fuel the conflict. 
  
3.4.2. Step two: Industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international 
agencies in conflict zones 
Transnational political-security risk: Transnational political-security risk is concerned with 
the risk emanating from the regional level and affecting international agencies. It is 
comprised of the transnational risk factor, which is measured by the following indicators:  
• Transnational risk factor: Policies and actions of neighbours regarding host state; 
regional sanctions, treaties and agreements; conflict/war with neighbours; existence 
of terrorist/rebel/bandit/ insurgent groups; existence of transnational criminal 
networks; neighbour’s relationship with international agencies. 
National political-security risk: National political-security risk is comprised of political-
security risk emanating from the level of the host country. It can be further delineated by 
dividing it into four risk factors, namely: political, military/police, internal conflict, and 
societal which are measured by the indicators below:  
• Political risk factor: Type of regime in power; the political system; political 
stability; government corruption; local attitudes towards government, riots, political 
violence; government’s relationship with international agencies, and changes in 
government policies and actions regarding international agencies. 
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• Military/police risk factor: Composition, stability, and ability of military/police; 
existence of special units; populace’s attitude towards police/military; police/military 
relationship with international agencies. 
• Internal conflict risk factor: Civil war; existence of terrorist/bandit/insurgents/rebel 
groups. 
• Societal risk factor: Ethnic/linguistic/racial/national/traditional/religious divisions; 
gender roles; standards of living in conflict zone.  
Human political-security risk: Human political-security risk relates to the safety and 
security of individual international agency employees in a conflict zone. It is comprised of 
the human risk factor, which is measured by the following indicators: 
• Human risk factor: Ambush/assault/banditry/bombing/detention/kidnapping/ 
looting/rape/ sexual violence/ hijacking/carjacking/ mines.  
International agency-specific political-security risk: International agency-specific 
political-security risk involves risk stemming from aspects particular to an agency. It is 
comprised of two factors, namely, home/host country relations risk factor and affiliations risk 
factor, which are measured by the following indicators:  
•  Home/host country relations risk factor: Home/host country relations – receptive, 
diplomatic and accommodating relations, or unreceptive, hostile, and uncooperative; 
and home/host country treaties, agreements, and actions affecting international 
agencies in conflict zones. 
• Affiliations risk factor: Religious/political/ideological/historical/cultural/historical 
affiliations of international agency. 
 
3.4.2. 1. Practical application of the model in step two 
In step two the industry-specific political-security risk model shown in Figure 418 is utilised, 
allowing the analyst to attain an overall risk rating for the conflict zone within which an 
international agency is operating. Each of the risks carries a percentage weight (out of a total 
100% combined). For international agencies in conflict zones, the weight given to the four 
risks is as follows: transnational political-security risk – 20%, national political-security risk 
– 40%, human political-security security risk – 20%, and international agency-specific 
political-security risk – 20%. The risk factors are thus weighted as follows: transnational risk 
factor – 20%, political risk factor – 10%, military/police risk factor – 10%, internal conflict 
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risk factor – 10%, societal risk factor – 10%, human risk factor – 20%, home/host country 
relations risk factor – 10%, and affiliations risk factor – 10%. The reason that national 
political-security risk is given a heavier weighting of 40% is that its factors indicators have 
the most bearing on the conflict zone within which international agencies are operating and, 
therefore, on the security of international agencies. 
 In order to utilise the model, a discrete19 rating of 1 to 4 is given for each factor on the 
industry-specific political-security risk model. The rating system is based on the following: 1 
– Low Risk, 2 – Medium Risk, 3 – High Risk, 4 – Extreme Risk. In order to work out the 
weighted risk rating for each factor, the rating given to the factor is multiplied by the 
numerical weight of the factor and thereafter, this is divided by the maximum total rating of 
the factor (which is 4). In order to attain the overall risk rating for the conflict zone, the 
individual weighted ratings of all the factors are added together, resulting in a percentage 
overall risk rating of the conflict zone. The full mathematical formula for achieving an 
overall risk rating for a conflict zone is provided below:  
 
ORRA  Overall Risk Rating of Conflict Zone A 
WR1   Weighted Rating of Factor 1 
R1  Rating of Risk Factor 1 
W1  Weight of Risk Factor 1 
MTR  Maximum Total Rating of Any Factor  
i  ith Infinite Factor  
n  n
th Factor   
 
ORRA = WR1 + WR2 + ... WRn        (1) 
  
= ∑            (2) 
WR1 =  ∙            (3) 
WRn =  ∙            (4) 
ORRA =  ∙   +  ∙  

 ...  ∙  

     (5) 
ORRA = ∑  ∙

          (6) 
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 Discrete means that the score can only be an integer, i.e. 1, 2, 3, or 4. 
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For the analyst utilising the model in a conflict zone, it suffices to know the simple form of 
the equation explaining how to attain an overall risk rating, which is the fifth equation 
provided above, or: 
 
ORRA =  ∙   +  ∙  














Figure 4: An industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones 
*Overall Risk Rating =
 
 ∙   +  ∙  

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
 ** International Agency 
















risk factor (10%) 
Internal conflict 
risk factor (10%) 
Societal risk factor 
(10%) 
Human risk factor 
(20%) 
Home/host country 








There are daily incidents of 
fighting between host state and 
neighbouring state(s) including 
daily attacks by regional 
terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel 
groups. Criminal networks 
permeate all activity in the 
conflict zone. All policies and 
actions of neighbouring state are 
hostile to IAs**. 
All government policies 
and actions are hostile to 
IAs. There is a complete 
breakdown of government 
control in conflict zone. 
Extreme corruption exists. 
Daily opposition to the 
government exists in the 
form of political violence 
and/or riots. 
Military/police have no 
functional capability and 
will to maintain law and 
order in the conflict zone 
and/or are participants in 
conflict. Populace has no 
trust in them. Military/ 
police provide no support 
to IAs.  
There are daily incidents 
of fighting due to civil 
war/ internal conflict. 
Terrorist/insurgent/ 
bandit/rebel groups strike 
on a daily basis in the 
conflict zone. 
 Extreme ethnic/ linguistic/ 
racial/religious/national/ 
cultural factionalism is 
evident in the conflict zone. 
Gender roles/expectations 
are severely enforced. 
Standard of living in the 
conflict zone is rapidly 
deteriorating on a daily 
basis.  
There are daily occurrences 





looting/bombing/ landmines.  
All home/host country relations 
are hostile and uncooperative due 
to policies/actions/treaties/ 
agreements/ideology/symbolism 
of home country, and/or history 
of home country in host country. 
Persecution of IAs due to 
nationality of home country is 
certain. 
Attack and/or 
persecution of IAs in 
the conflict zone is 
certain due to their 








 There are weekly incidents of 
fighting between host state and 
neighbouring state(s) including 
weekly attacks by regional 
terrorist/ insurgent/ bandit/rebel 
groups. Criminal networks affect 
most activity in the conflict zone. 
Most policies and actions of 
neighbouring state are hostile to 
IAs. 
Most government policies 
and actions are hostile to 
IAs. Government has 
little control in conflict 
zone. High levels of 
corruption exist. Weekly 
opposition to the 
government exists in the 
form of political violence 
and/or riots. 
Military/police have little 
functional capability and 
will to maintain law and 
order in the conflict zone 
and/or are participants in 
conflict. Populace has 
limited trust in them. 
Military/police provide 
little support to IAs. 
There are weekly 
incidents of fighting due 
to civil war/internal 
conflict. Terrorist/ 
insurgent/bandit/rebel 
groups strike on a weekly 
basis in the conflict zone. 
High ethnic/linguistic/ 
racial/ religious/ national/ 
cultural factionalism is 
evident in the conflict zone. 
Gender roles/ expectations 
are strictly enforced. 
Standard of living in the 
conflict zone is 
deteriorating. 
There are weekly 







The majority of home/host 
country relations are hostile and 
unreceptive due to 
policies/actions/treaties/ 
agreements/ideology/symbolism 
of home country, and/or history 
of home country in host country. 
Persecution of IAs due to 
nationality of home country is 
likely. 
Attack and/or 
persecution of IAs in 
the conflict zone is 
likely due to their 








There are monthly incidents of 
fighting between host state and 
neighbouring state(s) including 
monthly attacks by regional 
terrorist/ insurgent/ bandit/rebel 
groups. Criminal networks affect 
some activity in the conflict zone. 
The policies and actions of 
neighbouring state are indifferent 
to IAs. 
Government policies and 
actions are indifferent to 
IAs. Government has 
some control in conflict 
zone. Moderate levels of 
corruption exist. Monthly 
opposition to the 
government exists in the 
form of political violence 
and/or riots. 
Military and Police are 
functional and fairly 
capable at maintaining 
law and order in the 
conflict zone. Populace 
displays some trust in 
them. Military and/or 
police provide some 
support to IAs. 
There are monthly 
incidents of fighting due 
to civil war/internal 
conflict. Terrorist/ 
insurgent/bandit/rebel 
groups strike on a 





exist. Gender roles/ 
expectations are moderately 
enforced. There are varying 
standards of living in the 
conflict zone..  
There are monthly 
occurrences of the following 
incidents: assault/ambush/ 
kidnapping/banditry/rape/ 
sexual violence/ detention/ 
hijacking/carjacking/ 
looting/ bombing/landmines. 
Home/host country relations are 
neutral due to 
policies/actions/treaties/ 
agreements/ideology/symbolism 
of home country, and/or history 
of home country in host country. 
Persecution of IAs due to 
nationality of home country is 
uncertain. 
Attack and/or 
persecution of IAs in 
the conflict zone is 









There are annual incidents of 
fighting between host state and 
neighbouring state(s) including 
annual attacks by terrorist/ 
insurgent/bandit/rebel groups. 
Criminal networks rarely affect 
activity in the conflict zone. All 
policies and actions of 
neighbouring state are friendly to 
IAs. 
Government policies and 
actions are friendly to 
IAs. Government has 
control in conflict zone. 
Low levels of corruption 
exist. Opposition to the 
government is not 
apparent. 
Military and police are 
functional and competent 
in maintaining law and 
order in the conflict zone. 
Populace trusts them. 
Military and/or police 
provide good support to 
IAs. 
Civil war exists, though 
actual fighting is 
infrequent. Terrorist/ 
insurgent/bandit/rebel 




tension is uncommon. 
Gender roles/expectations 
are flexible. Standard of 
living in the conflict zone is 
reasonable. 
There are annual 







Home/host country relations are 
friendly and cooperative due to 
policies/actions/treaties/ 
agreements/ideology/symbolism 
of home country, and/or history 
of home country in host country. 
Persecution of IAs due to 
nationality of home country is 
unlikely. 
Attack and/or 
persecution of IAs in 
the conflict zone is 








In order to interpret the result obtained through the use of the industry-specific political-
security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones, the analyst needs a guideline 
or risk-grading scale. Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication is a 
simple risk-grading scale, the use of which gives the analyst a total operational and political-
security risk indication of the conflict zone within which the international agency is 
operating. The next step would be to implement risk mitigation and management measures 
based upon the overall risk rating gained. However, as stated in chapter one20, this research 
study is solely focused on political-security risk analysis and its scope therefore does not 
extend beyond providing a scale for interpreting the results of an industry-specific political-
security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones.  
 
Scale for operational and political-security risk indication 
Risk rating (%) Operational indication Political-security risk indication 
0-19 Very low risk 
Low 
20-39 Low risk 
40-49 Low to moderate risk 
Medium 
50-59 Moderate risk 
60-74 High risk High 
75-100 Extreme risk Extreme 
Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the primary focus of this chapter has been on the development of an industry-
specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. The 
objective was to develop a model based on the theory of political risk set out in chapter two. 
The development of this model was enhanced by the analysis of the relationship between 
international agencies, contemporary conflicts, and the post-9/11 global political-security 
landscape, which served to illuminate the evolving dynamics between political-security risk 
and international agencies. In addition, three political risk models specific to the energy 
industry were examined with the aim of extracting aspects relevant to the development of an 
industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. 
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 See section 1.6 Limitations and delimitations of the research study. 
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Thereafter, the security risk frameworks currently utilised by three international agencies – 
CARE International, ECHO, and the UN – were analysed in order to evaluate their strengths 
and more importantly for this research study, their limitations. Subsequently, the factors, 
indicators and methodological aspects relevant to the building of a political-security risk 
model for international agencies in conflict zones were discussed and presented. This chapter 
culminated in the development of a political-security risk model specific to international 
agencies in conflict zones and a corresponding risk-grading scale for interpreting the results 
of the model.  
 Chapter four will focus on the application of the model developed in this chapter to 
the case study of international agencies in the conflict zone of eastern Chad. By undertaking 
the type of industry-specific political-security risk analysis that was specified in this chapter, 
a comprehensive picture of the political-security risks facing international agencies in eastern 





















Chapter 4: A political-security risk analysis for international 
agencies in eastern Chad 
4.1. Introduction 
The focus of chapter four is on testing the industry-specific political-security risk model 
developed in chapter three by applying it to the case study of international agencies in eastern 
Chad. For the purpose of acquainting the reader with the role of international agencies in 
eastern Chad, this chapter provides a brief introductory account of the international agency 
presence in eastern Chad from January 2003 until May 2010. Thereafter, the two steps of 
political-security risk analysis will be embarked upon. In step one, a conflict analysis of 
eastern Chad will be undertaken in order to facilitate the analyst’s in-depth knowledge of the 
origin and drivers of this conflict. Thereafter, using the model, step two, an industry-specific 
political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones will be completed.  
 Due to the fact that the following political-security risk analysis of eastern Chad is not 
being conducted for a particular agency, there is no knowledge of international agency-
specific political-security risk and the factors and indicators comprising it. In order to test the 
applicability of the model, the average risk rating of the preceding factors will be used. This 
will allow an overall risk rating for eastern Chad to be achieved. The overall political-security 
risk rating attained in this chapter is therefore as accurate as possible in light of the lack of 
information about agency-specific particularities. Obviously, when conducted for a specific 
international agency in a particular conflict zone, the analyst will be able to produce an 
analysis that includes all the agency-specific elements. 
 
4.2. International agencies in eastern Chad21 
Approximately 70 international agencies have been present in eastern Chad since the start of 
hostilities in Sudan’s Darfur region in 2003, which saw the migration of over 250 000 
refugees to Chad (Afrol News, 2009). The ensuing conflict in eastern Chad from 2005 
onwards has also created over 167 000 displaced Chadians. Furthermore, refugees fleeing 
conflict in the CAR have also contributed to the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad (Ploch, 
2009: 3). As a result, international agencies in eastern Chad are assisting in providing 
“refugee protection and assistance; psychosocial services; agricultural and food security 
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 See Map 1: Map of eastern Chad 
 interventions; emergency food assista
services”, among others (USAID, 2010: 1). 
In conjunction with the efforts by international agencies to address the humanitarian situation 
in eastern Chad, was the establishment in 2007 of a multinational 
eastern Chad whose task it was to “contribute to the protection of refugees, IDPs and civilians 
in danger; facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and create favourable 
conditions for reconstruction and economic and s
presence was made up of two bodies, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and 
Chad (MINURCAT), which had no military force component until 2009 when it too
from the EU military force (EUFOR). EUFOR
civilians and facilitating the free movemen
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 Map sourced from the Nations Online Project (2010).
nce; and health, nutrition, water, sanitation, 
 
Map 1: Map of eastern Chad 22 
UN-sanctioned presence in 
ocial development”. This multinational 
 was tasked with providing general security for 






 personnel (Ploch, 
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2009: 5). A decision was made in March 2010 to extend MINURCAT’s mission in Chad until 
15 May 2010 (UNDPI, 2010). On 25 May 2010 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
voted unanimously to reduce the military component of MINURCAT from its current 3300 
troops to 2200 military personnel (1900 in Chad and 300 in the CAR) by 15 July 2010. 
Withdrawal of the remaining troops will begin on 15 October 2010 and all military and 
civilian personnel are to be withdrawn by 31 December 2010. This decision was made under 
pressure from Chadian president, Idriss Déby, who has reassured the UN that his government 
will take responsibility to protect civilians, including the humanitarian community (UN News 
Centre, 2010). The looming departure of the peacekeepers has elevated concerns of a major 
security vacuum in eastern Chad. This concern is compounded by the Chadian governments’ 
lack of a concrete plan to provide security in the absence of UN peacekeepers (IC News, 
2010). The next section provides an in-depth analysis of the security risks facing international 
agencies in eastern Chad through the application of the two steps of industry-specific 
political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones.  
 
4.3. Step one: Conflict analysis 
The conflict analysis takes the form of a report commissioned by an international agency 
either planning on operating in eastern Chad or currently operating in eastern Chad. It is a 
discursive analysis of the origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad. The aim in this 
regard, is for the analyst to gain a background understanding of the conflict in order to 
facilitate informed analysis when it comes to industry-specific political-security risk analysis 
in step two. 
 
4.3.1. Origin of the conflict in eastern Chad23 
In order to understand the main aspects of this conflict, this section addresses the root causes 
of the conflict in this region. Specifically, the variables to be discussed in this section are: 
history of the region in relation to the conflict, history of the country in relation to the 
conflict, and history of the conflict.  
 Since 1960 when Chad gained its independence from France, it has faced extreme and 
often violent turmoil. Like its regional counterparts, this land-locked country is divided along 
ethnic, religious and regional lines. These divisions can be seen in the identification of the 
southerners with the Central African Republic (CAR), the northerners with Libya, and those 
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 See Appendix D: Chronology of the origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad. 
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in the east, with the Sudanese region of western Darfur. The division between the mostly 
Arab-influenced north and the black African south is compounded by the relatively fertile 
character of the southern region. During the colonial period this meant that the southerners 
garnered the favour of the French and, therefore, political and military control of the state at 
independence (The Enough Team, n.d: 1). The nature of French colonisation was to 
contribute to the unhappy state of affairs in which Chad now finds itself as the French did not 
pursue policies designed to unite Chad due to the fact that the country served as little more 
than a source of raw cotton and unskilled labour. France’s brand of colonisation meant that at 
independence Chad was a nation comprised of a vast and diverse territory, scant resources, a 
nearly non-existent market and a vast impoverished society with varied political traditions, 
ethnic and regional loyalties (Alusala, 2007: 58). With hindsight it can be said that the scene 
was set for armed conflict involving a host of players from the regional, national and local 
level. 
 Political instability in Chad manifested in earnest in 1965, when a tax protest led by 
northern Islamic groups turned into a rebellion against the southern Christian-dominated 
government (Ploch, 2009: 1). President Tombalbaye’s authoritarian approach alienated both 
northerners and easterners and in 1975, in the midst of a fully fledged war against his regime, 
Tombalbaye was assassinated in Chad’s first coup d’état. Thereafter, General Felix Malloum 
(1975-1979), Goukouni Oueddei (1979-1982) and Hissène Habré (1982-1990) were all 
deposed in a similar manner. The fortunes of Chad’s presidents have been intimately tied to 
the involvement of outsiders, including Libya, Sudan, the US, and France. Libya’s 
involvement started with its leader, Muammar Gaddafi’s alleged coup plot against 
Tombalbaye in 1971. Libya-Chadian relations were not all sour and in 1979, northerner 
Goukouni Ouddei, with the support of Libya, forced President Malloum out of power. 
Ouddei’s regime was short-lived as in 1982 Hissène Habré led a successful revolt against his 
Libya-backed government (The Enough Team, n.d.: 2). Libya has not been the only foreign 
interest in Chad. Indeed, the US and France backed Habré during the Cold War in a proxy 
war against Gaddafi. Habré’s brutal reign finally unravelled in 1990 in the aftermath of the 
Cold War and the suspension of Western funding and support. This paved the way for 
Habré’s former chief of staff, Idriss Déby, to launch a successful rebellion that saw him 
ascend to the presidency in 1990 (Ploch, 2009: 1). It is Déby’s links to eastern Chad and 
Darfur through the Zaghawa ethnic group, a semi-nomadic minority group whose population 
straddles the Chad-Sudan border, that have been instrumental in both his rise to power and 
the current crisis in eastern Chad. Indeed, Déby found much support from Sudanese Islamists 
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and the Zaghawa in Darfur, both of whom had an interest in the defeat of the West-friendly 
Habré. Déby and his troops were armed and trained in Sudan and Déby launched his 
successful coup with the support of Libya and Sudan (Eriksson and Hagstromer, 2005: 35). 
The cross-border collusion between Sudan and Chad has engendered an explosive and violent 
relationship between the two countries, which shall be investigated in the next section in 
relation to the drivers of conflict in eastern Chad.  
 Déby is Chad’s longest-serving president and he came to power when the “wind of 
democratisation was blowing in over francophone Africa” (Eriksson and Hagstromer, 2005: 
26). Though Déby pledged to create a multi-party democratic political system, any elements 
of democracy that were initiated during his rule have been overshadowed by his willingness 
to crack down brutally on any opponents or challengers and widespread presidential 
patronage to purchase support from warlords and clan leaders, among other nefarious 
practices (Ploch, 2009: 1 and The Enough Team, n.d.: 2). During Déby’s tenure, a number of 
presidential and legislative elections24 have taken place, though all have been marked by 
irregularities, fraud and extensive human rights violations, culminating in Déby’s amendment 
to the constitution in 2005 to allow himself a third term in power (Eriksson and Hagstromer, 
2005: 27). Movement towards democratisation in Chad has largely been thwarted by the 
commencement of oil extraction in the country. Indeed, oil revenues have gone a long way to 
financing Déby’s regime, thereby keeping him in power (The Enough Team, n.d.: 2). Déby 
has also faced numerous coup attempts by a range of armed regional and political factions 
that have been in operation since 1990. More recently, in 2005 armed opposition to Déby in 
the form of rebel alliances made up of defectors from the Chadian army, the government, 
Sudan-sponsored Chadian rebels and others, has led to widespread conflict in eastern Chad, 
which has been compounded by the existence of conflict in Darfur from 2003 onwards.  
 Evaluation: In sum, regional relationships have played a pivotal role in the genesis of 
conflict in eastern Chad. The relationship between Chad and Sudan in particular, and 
President Déby’s links to Darfur through the Zaghawa ethnic group, can be singled out as 
integral to the development of conflict in eastern Chad. Conflict in eastern Chad is also 
attributable to the nature of French colonialism, which compounded divisions within Chadian 
society. Moreover, Chad’s history of dictatorships and widespread presidential patronage has 
fostered a climate within which violent opposition is the norm. The next section looks more 
closely at the drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad.  
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4.3.2. Drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad 
This section examines the drivers of conflict in eastern Chad. The variables to be discussed 
are: political, economic or pecuniary, social, and ideological. HRW (HRW, 2007: 21), which 
has undertaken comprehensive research on the conflict in eastern Chad and published a 
number of reports on the subject, underscores that the conflict is driven by access to “land 
and natural resources, particularly water, in an area of environmental extremes..., the 
destabilizing impact of the broader political tensions in Chad, the influence of the numerous 
armed groups in the region, many linked to the Darfur conflict, and the manner in which the 
Chadian government has responded to the insecurity”.  
 Firstly, a number of internal political factors contributed to events coming to a head in 
eastern Chad in 2005. The first of these was Déby’s refusal to provide direct support to his 
kinsmen, the Sudanese Zhaghawa rebels, against the government of Sudan in Darfur. This 
infuriated many Chadian government officials whom Déby had appointed based on their 
membership of the same group. This led to an attempted coup in May 2004. Compounding 
this was Déby’s 2005 decision to push for constitutional changes in order to allow him to 
serve a third term as president. In late 2005, members of the Chadian armed forces as well as 
close members of Déby’s own family defected to join Chadian opposition groups located in 
eastern Chad and Darfur. The defections were based on the burgeoning discontent described 
above, as well as the pecuniary aim to win oil concessions from Déby, who had so far 
jealously guarded Chad’s new oil revenues (HRW: 2006: 5). Hostilities began in earnest in 
December 2005 when Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (SCUD) and Rally for 
Democracy and Freedom (RDL) rebels began their campaign of rebel incursions into eastern 
Chad from Darfur. Indeed, the raid on the strategic town of Adré in eastern Chad saw major 
hostilities between Chadian rebels and Chadian security forces supported by Sudan-
sponsored Darfur rebels (HRW, 2007: 18). The government of Chad’s decision to withdraw 
the Chadian National Army (ANT) from the border areas in order to bolster strategic points 
in eastern Chad, such as the towns of Adré and Abéché, against rebel attacks meant that 
armed groups could operate unchecked. In addition, the Chadian government has largely 
ignored escalating communal violence and militia attacks in eastern Chad, either blaming the 
Sudanese government of orchestrating the attacks, or attributing them to a problem between 
agriculturalists and pastoralists. This security vacuum has had disastrous consequences for 
civilians and created the conditions for a proxy war to develop between rebel forces from 
both Chad and Sudan (HRW, 2007: 21).  
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Hostilities in Sudan’s western region of Darfur have been festering since 2003 when the 
government of Sudan and its Janjaweed militias launched a counterinsurgency in Darfur 
against ethnic Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit rebel groups and civilians (HRW, 2006a: 2). Since 
the start of the conflict in Darfur, the term Janjaweed has become a catch-all phrase to 
describe militia groups operating in this region. Specifically, HRW (2007: 22) states that the 
term encompasses two distinct types of armed forces: “militia groups recruited, trained, 
armed, and supplied by the government of Sudan and used as proxy forces in the 
government’s military campaign against Sudanese rebel groups and primarily comprised of 
Sudanese and Chadian Arabs; and opportunistic armed elements taking advantage of the total 
collapse of law and order to settle scores, loot villages, and raid cattle and livestock”. The 
ethnic cleansing and war crimes committed in Darfur have led to a major humanitarian crisis 
with the displacement of more than two million Sudanese, the majority of whom have fled to 
eastern Chad as refugees (HRW, 2006a: 2). The influx of Sudanese refugees added to the 
already tenuous social and political landscape in eastern Chad, placed added pressure on 
scant local resources and further strained relations between Chad and Sudan.  
 Apart from the humanitarian disaster caused by the conflict in Darfur, Sudanese and 
Chadian relations also plummeted during this time, as both governments were supporting 
rebels active against the other along their common, 1360km border (Ploch, 2009: 3 and 
HRW, 2006a: 4). This culminated in the declaration of a “state of belligerence” in December 
2005 and relations between the two countries have ranged from covertly antagonistic to 
overtly conflicting ever since (HRW, 2006b: 8). Indeed, the lawlessness and violent chaos 
that has characterised eastern Chad is aptly captured in the following description of affairs: 
Various militia groups including Janjaweed groups based in Darfur and Arab militias based 
in Chad and Darfur have raped and killed Chadian civilians, have looted and burned 
Chadian villages and stolen livestock and other property. Community-based Chadian self-
defense groups have killed Chadian civilians. Self-defense groups and government of Chad-
supported Sudanese rebel movement with bases in Chad have been responsible for the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. The government of Chad has failed to take adequate 
action to protect civilians, has failed to bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice, 
and has allowed a climate of impunity to persist in eastern Chad (HRW, 2007: 24).  
 
A less obvious driver of conflict in eastern Chad is related to the exploitable grievances of 
communities in eastern Chad. Eastern Chad, and particularly the Dar Sila25 region, has rich 
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 The Dar Sila region is located in the south-eastern border area of eastern Chad (HRW, 2006a: 9). 
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soil and plentiful water resources that allows profitable farming relative to other areas in 
Chad. This area attracted IDPs in the 1980s when a severe drought forced approximately 10% 
of the Chadian population to relocate. Additionally, mass livestock fatalities during this time 
drove Arab nomads to turn to agriculture in order to survive, making access to land and 
security of tenure an increasingly heated issue. Challenges to the customary land system in 
this part of eastern Chad were widespread and animosity between drought migrants and local 
communities over access to land began to unravel the social fabric in this region. This 
situation was exploited in the early 2000s for recruitment purposes by armed actors from both 
sides of the Chad-Sudan border (HRW, 2009: 18-19). The widespread conflict in eastern 
Chad, mass displacements, limited resources, and regional instability outlined in this section 
have created a “disaster... due to ongoing insecurity and humanitarian needs” (USAID, 2010: 
1). Indeed, there is an acute demand in eastern Chad for the assistance of international 
agencies.  
 Evaluation: The main drivers of conflict in eastern Chad are, namely, the 
destabilising political tensions engendered by Déby’s patrimonial rule and the aggressive 
manner in which the Chadian government has responded to insecurity. The influence of 
numerous armed groups and bandits that operate with impunity in the border region between 
Chad and Sudan, as well as the fraught relationship between Chad and Sudan, are also central 
drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad. Further, social grievances over ethnic inequalities 
have been compounded by pecuniary conflict over land and natural resources. In the next 
section the industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict 
zones will be applied in order to analyse the security risk facing international agencies in 
eastern Chad.  
  
4.4. Step two: Political-security risk analysis for international agencies in eastern Chad 
The following political-security risk analysis for international agencies in eastern Chad will, 
like step one, take the form of a report commissioned by an international agency either 
planning on operating in eastern Chad or already operating in eastern Chad. As mentioned 
earlier, for the sake of testing the model and arriving at an overall risk rating for international 
agencies in eastern Chad, the two factors of international agency-specific political-security 
risk will be allocated the average risk rating of the preceding factors. This is due to the fact 
that there is no knowledge of the international agency-specific political-security risk factors 
and indicators and, therefore, they cannot be measured. The political-security risk factors will 
67 
 
now be analysed in relation to international agencies in eastern Chad and rated accordingly 
on the model.  
 
4.4.1. Transnational political-security risk 
4.4.1.1. Transnational risk factor 
The following sub-section discusses the following indicators: policies and actions of 
neighbours regarding host state; regional sanctions, treaties and agreements; conflict/war with 
neighbours; existence of regional terrorist/rebel/insurgent groups; existence of criminal 
networks; neighbour’s relationship with international agencies. 
 Of all its neighbouring states, the volatile relationship between Sudan and Chad has 
had and will continue to have, the greatest impact on the conflict in eastern Chad and, 
therefore, the security of international agencies operating there. The January 2010 agreement 
between President Idriss Déby and President Omar Hussein al-Bashir, in which Chad and 
Sudan agreed to end their proxy wars and engage in direct talks and joint development 
projects to rebuild the war-torn border area encompassing eastern Chad and Darfur, 
represented a positive step (Reuters, 2010). However, coming on the heels of a series of 
previously failed peace agreements, this latest agreement does not inspire any confidence in 
enduring peaceful relations between the two countries. As both countries face(d) important 
elections26 in 2010 and 2011, the peace agreement seems a way for Déby and al-Bashir to 
consolidate their regimes and according to Lipschutz (2010), “both regimes need [the peace 
agreement], but the underlying crises that triggered the end of their friendship in 2005 are not 
solved, only frozen”. By April 2010, the peace agreement was already called into question as 
intense fighting occurred near the Sudan border in which the Chadian army reportedly killed 
105 insurgents, although rebels state that both sides lost lives. There are no independent 
reports of the skirmish, however, the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Chad 
correspondent states that “it is unlikely that... the rebels could make serious inroads without 
backing from Sudan” (BBC News, 2010). Previously, in May 2009, Chadian rebels launched 
an attack on N’Djamena from Sudan. This led to Chad accusing Sudan of backing the Union 
of Forces for the Resistance (UFR), led by Timane Erdimi, a former advisor and nephew of 
Déby’s. In response to the attacks and mutual accusations, the Chadian and Sudanese air 
forces bombed each other’s territory in June (Amnesty International, 2010a).   
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 Chad’s president Idriss Déby faces a parliamentary election in November 2010 and a presidential election is 
scheduled for May 2011 (IFES, 2010a). Sudan’s president Omar Hussein al-Bashir won the presidential election 
in April 2010 and there is a referendum scheduled for January 2011 to decide on the matter of southern Sudan’s 
secession (IFES, 2010b).   
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Further, the humanitarian situation in eastern Chad is likely to remain precarious due to the 
“likelihood of continued conflict in Darfur” (UNHCR, 2010). Though 2010 has seen fewer 
reported incidents of fighting in the border zone between Chad and Sudan, eastern Chad has 
witnessed the occurrence of 192 reported attacks against humanitarian staff in 2009 as well as 
frequent attacks on civilians, refugees, and IDPs by bandits or rebel groups whose allegiance 
to either Chad or Sudan is extremely difficult to ascertain (USAID, 2010: 1). The Sudanese 
government’s 2009 expulsion of 16 humanitarian organisations from Darfur and other 
regions in response the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant for Omar Hussein 
al-Bashir, reveal Sudan’s history of open hostility to cooperating with, and facilitating 
international agencies. Al-Bashir has gone so far as to openly accuse foreign agencies of 
spying for the ICC and collaborating with the rebels (El-faki, 2010). Al-Bashir’s policies and 
actions against international agencies have implications for the security of agencies operating 
in the porous border region of eastern Chad, especially given El-faki’s (2010) contention that, 
“[p]art of the policy to expel the remaining humanitarian bodies from Sudan is to stage fear 
and create atmospheres of insecurity for their staff by planned abduction and kidnapping of 
their foreign nationals and aid workers”. 
 The other regional relationship having implications for the security of international 
agencies in eastern Chad is the one between Chad and the CAR. Indeed, the CAR is the third 
party in the intractable regional conflict zone encompassing eastern Chad and Sudan. The 
north eastern region of the CAR, bordering south eastern Chad is a lawless zone, the villages 
of which are the frequent target of attacks and occupation by CAR rebels and bandits 
(UNDPI, 2009). Constant conflict in north eastern CAR has forced over 68 000 refugees into 
eastern Chad. There are reports of “occasional” cross-border clashes between the Chadian 
government forces and CAR rebels and bandits (OSAC, 2010). More common though, are 
cross-border raids and attacks on international agencies, civilians, refugees and IDPs. There 
are, however, no reports linking the CAR government to conflicts outside its own borders 
(Hanson, 2007). Upcoming elections in the CAR are proposed for October 2010 and are a 
major concern for the stability of the country, particularly the unpredictable region bordering 
Chad and Sudan and the consequent potential for a recurrence of inter-ethnic conflict there 
(ReliefWeb, 2009). In addition, regarding the government’s response to international 
agencies operating in the north eastern conflict zone in the CAR, it is noted by the UN 
(UDPI, 2009) that “efforts to bring peace and law and order into the area [are] welcome”. 
 Chad’s relationship with Libya is also a recent concern. Libya has over the years 
played an important role in determining Chad’s political trajectory, including aiding President 
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Déby’s ascent to power in Chad. Recently though, international observers have expressed 
increasing concern over Libya’s influence over Chad’s affairs, despite welcoming the 
country’s involvement in the past. Specifically, President Gaddafi has publically opposed the 
UN/EU peacekeeping presence in Chad and is thought to be supporting rebel groups as well 
(IDMC, 2010: 4).  
 A last regional factor concerns that of criminal networks impacting on the security of 
international agencies in eastern Chad. Chad shares borders with Libya, Sudan, the CAR, 
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger, and criminal networks involving the trafficking of small arms 
and light weapons are a significant threat to security in eastern Chad. Large amounts of less 
significant goods are also smuggled into Chad through its extremely porous borders. It is the 
easy availability of weapons, however, that is the greatest cause for concern (OSAC, 2010). 
Indeed, commenting on the findings of the recent Small Arms Survey, Isenberg (2010) notes 
that “[t]he UN arms embargo has not prevented weapons from reaching Darfur, due to the 
unwillingness of the governments of Chad, Sudan, and other parties to abide by the terms of 
the embargo”, and that “available information indicates that the governments of Chad, Libya, 
and Eritrea have been involved in arming non-state groups in Darfur either as part of an 
official policy or by turning a blind eye to such activities”. The criminal network involving 
the proliferation of weapons in the region of eastern Chad is clearly a serious security 
problem that has for the most part been ignored by states in the region. 
 Risk evaluation: The transnational political-security issues dealt with in this sub-
section are a major concern to the overall stability of Chad in general and eastern Chad in 
particular. This is due to the intertwined and seemingly intractable nature of conflict in Sudan 
and, to a lesser extent, in the CAR. Attacks by, and conflict between, regionally-located 
bandits, rebel and insurgent groups and those located within Chad are a constant threat to 
international agencies operating in eastern Chad, occurring on a weekly basis. Prospects for 
future international agency operations in eastern Chad are bleak due to the increasing levels 
of conflict and insecurity in Darfur and the upcoming elections in Chad and Sudan. 
Moreover, the hostile policies and actions towards international agencies in Sudan and Libya 
are a serious threat to international agencies operating in the porous conflict zone of eastern 
Chad. Furthermore, criminal networks affect most activity in the conflict zone, with a serious 
concern being the trafficking of small arms and light weapons throughout the region.  





4.4.2. National political-security risk 
4.4.2.1. Political risk factor 
This sub-section discusses the following indicators: type of regime in power; the political 
system; political stability; government corruption; local attitudes towards government; riots; 
politically motivated violence; government’s relationship with international agencies and 
changes in government policies and actions regarding international agencies.  
 The government of Chad, led by President Déby is dominated by a strong executive 
branch which controls Chad’s political landscape. As stated previously27, Déby, like many of 
his predecessors, came to power in a coup in 1990. He was re-elected in 1996 and 2001, and 
in 2005 he amended the constitution to allow himself to serve a third term in power. Chadian 
elections have all been marked by irregularities and fraud and Chad is by no means an 
electoral democracy. The 2006 election took place shortly after a rebel assault on the capital, 
and most opposition parties boycotted it in protest of Déby’s amendment to the constitution 
(OSAC, 2010). In 2007, the government initiated a dialogue with the political opposition, 
resulting in the August 13 Accords. The Accords emphasised the creation of conditions to 
foster good governance, allowed for a new census, and postponed the 2007 legislative 
elections from 2007 until 2009. Legislative elections are now expected in November 2010, 
and presidential elections are scheduled for May 2011. Déby’s commitment to political 
dialogue with opposition members has been called into question on numerous occasions. 
Indeed, the February 2008 arrest of several opposition and civic leaders contributed to 
widespread distrust of Déby. Déby's appointment of a new prime minister in April 2008 and 
his appointment of four former political opponents to high-ranking cabinet positions 
suggested that the President might be leaning towards more inclusive governance, though 
others have viewed the appointments as an attempt to divide the opposition (Ploch, 2010: 2). 
Moreover, regarding government corruption and accountability, Chad is ranked 175 out of 
180 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, which is an 
incremental improvement since 2005 when it was placed last (Transparency International, 
2009). This corroborates views that corruption is rampant within in Déby’s inner circle 
(Freedom House, 2010). 
 In terms of opposition to the government, Déby faces continual armed opposition 
from groups, who, though deeply divided in terms of ethnicity and leadership, are united in 
their intention to overthrow him. Chad’s political arena is crowded with a multitude of 
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opposition parties. Indeed, President Déby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) is aligned 
with approximately 60 political parties, most of which are built around a single personality. 
Out of approximately 105 political parties active in Chad, only about 6 individuals have any 
real capacity as contenders in the upcoming 2011 presidential election (OSAC, 2010). 
Violent opposition to the government is common and with Chad’s history of regular coups, 
rebels have on a few occasions sought to dispose of Déby similarly. In fact, the latest coup 
attempt was in 2008. Most recent violent opposition has originated from the essentially 
lawless eastern Chad. This includes the 2009 coalition of 8 rebel factions into the UFR, led 
by Timane Erdimi28. Since the formation of the UFR in January 2009, there has been frequent 
conflict involving the Chadian army and the UFR (Amnesty International, 2010a). The April 
2010 fighting between the Chadian government forces and members of the rebel group 
Popular Front for National Rebirth (FPRN), who also oppose Déby’s presidency, is another 
indicator of the frequent violent opposition to the Chadian government (Clarke, 2010). The 
upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, combined with Chad’s history of 
widespread and violent opposition to the government, present a constant threat to democracy 
and political stability in Chad.  
 Regarding the Chadian government’s policies and actions towards international 
agencies, recent events indicate a growing disregard for the safety and security of 
international agencies and other foreign actors operating in the country. In January 2010 the 
government of Chad requested the UNSC not to renew the mandate of MINURCAT, calling 
MINURCAT redundant and ineffective (Dunin, 2010). Indeed, according to Diplomacy and 
Power (2010), Déby has always viewed the international presence as an infringement on 
Chad’s sovereignty. Following discussions with the Chadian authorities, MINURCAT’s 
mandate was extended until the 15 May 2010. On 25 May 2010 the UNSC announced that, in 
line with President Déby’s requests, the full withdrawal of the military and civilian 
component of MINURCAT by 31 December 2010 would be completed (Amnesty 
International, 2010b). The Chadian government has assured that it will take responsibility to 
protect civilians, including the humanitarian community in eastern Chad, when MINURCAT 
leaves. The decision to withdraw MINURCAT was made just a month after UN Under-
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, stated that he was “extremely 
worried” about the potential impact of the withdrawal on civilians (United Nations News 
Centre, 2010). Indeed, the exit of MINURCAT is likely to exacerbate the already volatile 
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security situation in eastern Chad, creating a security vacuum which is unlikely to be filled by 
the Chadian security forces. Furthermore, Déby’s insistence on MINURCAT’s withdrawal, 
coupled with his recent peace agreement with Sudan, indicate that he might be planning a 
military offensive against rebel groups in eastern Chad (Dunin, 2010). While there has been 
little outright hostility in policy and action towards international agencies, the government’s 
insistence on MINURCAT’s exit reveals a blatant disregard for the welfare of international 
agencies in the obviously volatile eastern Chad. Even with MINURCAT troops present in 
eastern Chad, the security situation has been extremely unstable, including exceedingly high 
levels of violence against aid workers and civilians, with 2009 recording the highest level of 
attacks on aid workers (Dunin, 2010, IDMC, 2010).  
 Risk evaluation: The above analysis reveals that Chad is currently extensively 
threatened by domestic instability. The Chadian government has little control in the conflict 
zone. Opposition forces to the government remain active in the east where groups have 
congregated to launch offensives against the Chadian government. What little control the 
government has had in the conflict zone in the east has been facilitated to a large extent by 
MINURCAT, whose exit is imminent. High levels of corruption exist, though the fact that 
elections are occurring is, at least, an encouraging sign, as is Déby’s willingness to cooperate 
in a dialogue with the UN. Déby’s insistence on MINURCAT’s exit is, however, a worrying 
aspect as it illustrates a growing hostility in policy and action to international agencies.  
Risk rating – High (3) 
       
4.4.2.2. Military/police risk factor 
The following sub-section discusses the following indicators: composition, stability, and 
ability of military/police; special units; populace’s attitude towards military/police and 
relationship of military/police with international agencies.  
 Chadian internal security forces are made up of the Chadian National Army (ANT), 
the gendarmie, the national police, the National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT), the General 
Directorate of Security Services for National Institutions (DGSSIE), and National Security 
Agency (ANS). The Integrated Security Detachment (DIS) is the police force responsible for 
reducing insecurity in refugee camps and protecting refugees and IDPs and it is an important 
actor with regard to international agency security in eastern Chad (USDS, 2010). One of the 
central concerns of MINURCAT has been to provide training and support to the DIS 
(Amnesty International, 2010b). MINURCAT’s imminent withdrawal has elevated doubts 
about the capabilities of the DIS who are poorly equipped, under-qualified, often 
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unprofessional and inconsistent, and besieged by corruption and discrimination (Villaverde, 
2010 and Clarke, 2010). Without MINURCAT’s presence and oversight, the possibility of a 
bidding war for protection duties between local Chadian commanders has been raised. 
Indeed, because the various forces “have more loyalty to their commanders than to the state, 
the region could be plunged into anarchy as bands of commercially-minded military 
commanders seek to make as much as possible” (Clarke, 2010). On a slightly encouraging 
note, it is reported that in the last few months of 2009 and early 2010 the DIS, with 
MINURCAT support, “has significantly improved its operations and conduct” (Villaverde, 
2010: 11).  
 Regarding Chadian security forces in general, it is noted by the USDS (2010) that 
“the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Civilians were killed 
in connection with the conflict in the east. Security forces committed politically motivated 
killings. Killings were often committed by ‘men in uniform’, and it was often not possible to 
determine whether perpetrators were members of the armed forces or police, and whether 
they were acting on official orders. The government generally did not prosecute or punish 
members of the security forces who committed killings”. Aside from the killings committed 
by the Chadian security forces, they have also been blamed for numerous disappearances, 
abductions, torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment, rape, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, use of excessive force and abuse, and arbitrary interference 
with privacy, family, home, and correspondence. There have also been reports of government 
forces using and recruiting child soldiers in eastern Chad (USDS, 2010 and The Fund for 
Peace, 2010)29. Furthermore, the ANS and the DGSSIE are two security forces that answer 
only to the president (The Fund for Peace, 2010). This means that they cannot be held 
accountable by civil society and as a result they can act with impunity. Another worrying 
aspect concerns reports that the defection of Chadian soldiers and police to rebel groups is a 
common occurrence. This is due to the fact that the salaries of security forces tend to go 
unpaid, thereby making defection to a rebel group a more lucrative option (The Fund for 
Peace, 2010).  
 Risk evaluation: The analysis of political and military indicators has shown that the 
Chadian military and police have no functional capability or will to maintain law and order in 
the conflict zone and provide no support to international agencies. Chadian security forces are 
more of a threat than a help to international agencies. They operate with total impunity in 
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eastern Chad and are both complicit and even often participants in the banditry and 
criminality characterising the conflict zone. Though the DIS has provided a semblance of 
security for international agencies operating in the conflict zone, this has been facilitated by 
the leadership of MINURCAT, whose assistance shall be shortly terminated. Given the 
departure of MINURCAT, the future of the DIS as providers of support and security to 
international agencies in eastern Chad looks increasingly dubious. The populace has no trust 
in the Chadian military and police as they are not able to hold them accountable in any 
manner and are continually abused by the military and police. 
Risk rating – Extreme (4) 
 
4.4.2.3. Internal conflict risk factor 
The indicators to be discussed in this sub-section are: civil war; existence of terrorist/ 
insurgents/bandit/rebel groups. 
 According to the Fund for Peace (2010), conflict in Chad “reached its nadir in 2008, 
when rebel groups assaulted N’Djamena in an attempt to overthrow President Déby”. 
Thereafter, January 2009 saw the afore-mentioned grouping of eight rebel factions form the 
UFR, who launched an offensive from bases in Darfur and continue to pose a credible threat 
to Déby’s regime (Freedom House, 2010). In 2010 internal conflict has been limited to the 
fighting in eastern Chad in April between the Chadian government and rebel groups, resulting 
in the death of approximately 105 FPRN rebels, the capture of 62 rebels, and the possible 
death of nine government soldiers (Clarke, 2010). The Chadian Communication Minister, 
Kedellah Younous, went so far as to announce that Chadian security forces now control the 
entire conflict zone of eastern Chad, though this is highly improbable. Indeed, as Roland 
Marchal (quoted in Clarke, 2010) at the Centre for International Studies and Research in 
Paris noted, “This is very doubtful... the rebels are now scattered near the three borders area 
with no basic equipment or logistics to get to the capital, N’Djamena. It is easier for them to 
stay near the [refugee] camps as they are not in a position to be very aggressive”. While the 
rebels may not now be in a position to launch a strong enough offensive to overthrow the 
Chadian government, the existence of low-scale conflict, banditry and criminality is endemic 
to eastern Chad. These forms of conflict have multiplied, despite the presence of 
MINURCAT in eastern Chad (IDMC, 2010: 3). 
 The targeting of civilians, IDPs, the local population, and humanitarian workers 
through banditry, criminality and low-scale conflict is rampant in eastern Chad (UNHCR, 
2010). Indeed, Villaverde (2010: 6) captures the situation as follows:  
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All civilians, including local villagers, refugees, IDPs, humanitarian and UN staff have been 
victims of aggressive robberies, physical attacks and intimidation. Victims consistently 
describe bandits as ‘janjaweed’ or unidentified individuals wearing military uniforms 
carrying automatic machine guns... The large-scale intercommunal conflict that caused the 
displacement of over 180 000 people has diminished significantly since mid-2007... However 
the threat of renewed conflict remains as concentrated refugee and IDP populations outstrip 
available resources and IDPs try to return to their villages of origin. 
Large-scale conflict is far less common at present than the less obvious, though no less 
serious, forms of conflict described above. Moreover, the potential for conflict as refugees 
and IDPs attempt to return to their places of origin is high, as land, homes, and villages have 
often been taken over by new families in their absence. Furthermore, the large population of 
refugees and IDPs ensures that bandits, rebels and criminals have a constant source of new 
victims to prey on.  
 Risk evaluation: In sum, the frequency of armed and inter-ethnic fighting is no 
longer a daily reality as it was up until 2007. Attacks and violence by bandits, rebel groups 
and criminals gangs on refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers now characterises eastern 
Chad. The conflict in eastern Chad is, therefore, not an active civil war, but rather a lawless 
zone in which the widespread operation of violent bandits, criminal gangs and rebel groups is 
the norm.    
Risk rating – Extreme (3) 
 
4.4.2.4. Societal risk factor 
In this sub-section the following indicators are analysed: ethnic/linguistic/racial/national/ 
traditional/religious divisions; gender roles and standards of living in conflict zone.  
 According to Decalo (1980: 491), “So sharp indeed are Chad’s internal cleavages and 
inconsistencies that the major question about the post-independence era may well be why the 
territory did not disintegrate more rapidly”. As noted in step one, Chad is a country deeply 
divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and all of these cleavages have been 
consistently exploited by successive leaders in order for them to gain or remain in power. 
President Déby has relied on “ethnic polarization to maintain power, monopolizing access to 
resources... pitt[ing] the northern region against the south and favour[ing] his ethnic group, 
the Zaghawa, over others” (Bessell and Campbell, 2008: 2). Ethnic factionalism is 
particularly intense in eastern Chad, where the Chadian government has sponsored Zaghawa-
dominated rebel groups in Sudan in opposition to the Sudanese government, and the 
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Sudanese government has sponsored rebels in opposition to the Chadian government, while 
at the same time targeting ethnic Zaghawa in the conflict in Darfur and across the border in 
eastern Chad (HRW, 2009: 16).  
 Apart from the ethnically-based conflict involving Chad and Sudan, inter-tribal 
violence has characterised Chad’s own civil conflict. According to Refugees International 
(2007: 1), the number of IDPs in eastern Chad is in excess of 100 000 people, due entirely to 
inter-tribal violence. Furthermore, “[t]he displaced consistently characterise themselves as 
non-Arab and their attackers as Arab; these may refer more to status as settled farmers and 
nomadic herdsmen rather than specific ethnicities. Motivations for the attacks include... lack 
of a traditional homeland or grazing rights for some nomadic Arab tribes; an ideology of 
Arab superiority and solidarity emanating from the governments of Libya and, more recently, 
Sudan” (Refugees International, 2007: 1). Indeed, factionalism regarding the differences 
between Arabs and non-Arabs has overlapped with conflict over land tenure and access to 
resources, particularly within eastern Chad. HRW (2009: 18) sums up this complex state of 
affairs in the following: “From Goube, Nowaybe Arabs... conducted recruitment in Dar Sila 
for the militia groups that would come to be known as the Chadian Janjaweed, issuing a call 
to arms that resonated with landless groups including Arab nomads, Ouaddaiens, and other 
members of non-Arab ethnic groups that migrated to Dar Sila in the drought years”. 
Moreover, due to the insecure operating environment in eastern Chad, many aid agencies’ 
movements have been curtailed. This has resulted in an unintentional inequitable distribution 
of aid, which has served to compound tensions between Arab and non-Arab Chadians as 
many Arab Chadians believe that they are victims of bias (HRW, 2009: 37).  
 Violent factionalism is therefore highly evident with the most important aspects being 
race (African vs Arab), tribe, and profession (nomadic vs pastoralist). Furthermore, 
differences have been greatly magnified by conflict in eastern Chad, Sudan and the CAR 
which has resulted in a humanitarian disaster that has seen hundreds of thousands of refugees 
and IDPs descend on eastern Chad. Added tension has been particularly intense with regard 
to access to resources and land. The drought that has plagued the Sahel region from 2009 
onwards has made an already dire food shortage situation in eastern Chad even worse 
(USAID, 2010: 2). Indeed, standards of living in eastern Chad are deteriorating, with the 
Global Hunger Index rating the situation as “extremely alarming”. More worrying is a World 
Food Programme report which states that “[w]ith no new harvest until October 2010, and 
with the lean season fast approaching, the situation will likely deteriorate (WFP, 2010: 4). 
Another pressing social concern is gender based. While gender roles are not strictly enforced 
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on a religious basis, there is significant gender violence in eastern Chad, especially rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, of which the perpetrators enjoy “virtual impunity” (Amnesty 
International, 2010a).  
 Risk evaluation: The analysis of societal political-security aspects reveals that the 
level of factionalism due to ethnic, racial, gender and tribal cleavages is high. The importance 
of racial and tribal affiliations in eastern Chad presents a pressing threat to international 
agencies that employ nationals of Chad and the surrounding regions. This is due to the 
potential for animosity to be directed at them on the basis of employees possessing the same 
or similar characteristics. Furthermore, there are high levels of gender-based violence in 
eastern Chad. This is a pressing concern for women working for international agencies in 
eastern Chad as perpetrators of these crimes operate with impunity in the conflict zone. The 
current drought in the region of eastern Chad is responsible for the deteriorating living 
standards among the refugee, IDP and general population in eastern Chad. This puts 
international agencies at an increased risk of banditry and looting as criminal gangs and rebel 
groups target the scarce resources that only international agencies possess. 
Risk rating – High (3) 
 
4.4.3. Human political-security risk 
4.4.3.1. Human risk factor 
This sub-section is measured through an analysis of the following indicators: ambush/ 
assault/kidnapping/banditry/detention/hijacking/carjacking/looting/bombing/land-mines/rape/ 
sexual violence. 
 The UN (UNOCHA, 2010: 44) lists the most pertinent risks for UN and other aid 
workers in eastern Chad as follows: “Humanitarians may fall victim to collateral damage of 
warfare in eastern Chad related to tensions with the Sudan; Break-in to compounds, armed 
robberies, carjackings as part of criminal activities; Ambushes by road bandits; Personal 
assaults such as violence and rape due to the lack of discipline among armed militia; 
Scattered unexploded ordinance; and kidnapping”. Indeed, official reports show that there 
have been many of these incidents. The 2008 figures show that between January and 
September, assailants carried out more than 120 attacks against relief agencies, including 5 
fatal incidents (USAID, 2008: 2). This figure increased dramatically in 2009 when criminal 
incidents against humanitarian staff in eastern Chad increased to the highest level in recent 
years, including 192 serious attacks against humanitarian staff between January and 
September (USAID, 2010: 2). Though statistics for 2010 are not yet readily available, 
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USAID (2010: 1) reports that “[a]s of late March, relief operations in eastern Chad remain 
constrained due to insecurity”. More specifically, Dunin (2010) notes that “[a]ttacks and 
kidnappings targeting humanitarian workers became more common in late 2009 and in early 
2010, reaching a frequency of one per week”. Moreover, USAID (2010: 1-2) observes that 
despite the recent peace agreement between Chad and Sudan, “insecurity in localities near the 
Chad-Sudan border continues to restrict humanitarian access” and “reports indicate that crime 
and armed banditry remain significant threats to humanitarian staff and assets, with a trend 
towards increased violence during attacks”. Regarding attacks on aid workers, it is also 
important to take into account the fact that in order to protect the right of privacy of 
employees, reports of incidents involving international agency staff are often not made 
public. The implication is that the above figures are a conservative estimate of attacks on 
international agencies in eastern Chad. Further, the regularity of the above types of incidents 
has caused some international agencies to restrict their programmes and/or relocate their 
staff, while others have suspended their operations in eastern Chad completely, though the 
need for assistance is as acute as ever (USAID, 2010: 2). 
 Risk evaluation: The above analysis of human security in eastern Chad clearly 
indicates that human security is a pertinent problem for international agencies. Currently the 
human security factor is the most real threat to international agencies as the situation has the 
potential to be extremely dangerous, even fatal, on a continual basis. Employees of 
international agencies face the reality of weekly occurrences of assaults, ambushes, banditry, 
kidnapping, rape, sexual violence, detention, hijacking and looting.  
Risk rating – High (3) 
 
4.4.4. International agency-specific political-security risk 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, international agency-specific political-security risk is 
not discussed in this particular political-security risk analysis. This is due to the fact that the 
nature of the information needed is agency-specific and thus unobtainable by an outsider. 
However, for the sake of testing the applicability of the model developed in this research 
study, the average rating of the six factors that have been analysed so far is given to the two 
factors of international agency-specific political-security risk, namely home/host country 
relations risk factor and affiliations risk factor. The rating allocated to these two factors is 
therefore 3. Furthermore, allocating the final two factors the average rating facilitates the 
most accurate overall risk rating of eastern Chad possible, given the limitation of being 
unable to obtain the international agency-specific information.  
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4.4.5. Calculating an overall risk rating for international agencies in eastern Chad 
Calculating an overall risk rating for international agencies in eastern Chad 
Political-security risk Risk Factor Score Weighting Risk rating 
Transnational Transnational 3 20% 15 
National 
Political 3 10% 7.5 
Military/police 4 10% 10 
Internal conflict 3 10% 7.5 
Societal 3 10% 7.5 




relations (3)* 10% 7,5 
Affiliations (3)* 10% 7.5 
Overall risk rating 77.5% 
Table 4: Calculating an overall risk rating for eastern Chad 
*Average risk rating of the preceding six risk factors 
 
4.4.6. Application of the scale for operational and political-security risk indication 
The final step in a political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones 
is the measurement of the overall risk rating ascertained for international agencies in eastern 
Chad against the scale for operational and political-security risk indication.30 This will allow 
the overall operational and political-security risk indication to be ascertained. The overall risk 
rating of 77.5% attained above puts eastern Chad in the extreme risk bracket (75-100) on the 
scale for operational and political-security risk indication. Therefore, it can be said that the 
overall operational and political-security risk currently facing international agencies in 
eastern Chad is extreme.  
 In sum, there is a high probability that international agencies in eastern Chad will be 
exposed to weekly incidents of cross-border incursions by rebel groups and bandits from 
Sudan mainly, and to a lesser extent from the CAR. Criminal networks involving weapons 
trafficking greatly affect the security environment, and there is the added concern of Sudan 
and Libya’s hostility in policy and practice towards international agencies. Of further concern 
is Chad’s burgeoning hostility towards international agencies. This is compounded by the fact 
that the government has little control in eastern Chad and faces frequent violent opposition 
                                                           
30
 See page 57, Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication.  
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from rebel groups located there. Security in eastern Chad is further compromised by the fact 
that the military and police of Chad have no functional capacity or will to maintain law and 
order and are in most cases participants in the conflict and party to the banditry and 
criminality which characterise eastern Chad. Fighting, banditry and criminal violence due to 
Chad’s internal conflict continue to pose a serious threat to the security of international 
agencies. Additionally, the high degree of racial, religious and occupational factionalism, 
combined with deteriorating standards of living in the conflict zone, means that international 
agencies are exposed to an increasingly dire social situation that is likely to deteriorate further 
throughout 2010. Lastly, international agencies face the constant risk of violent attacks in 
eastern Chad, including assault, ambush, kidnapping, banditry, rape and sexual violence, 
detention, hijacking, carjacking, looting, bombing, and landmines.     
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter was on the practical application of the political-security risk model 
developed for international agencies in chapter three, to the conflict zone of eastern Chad. 
The two-step process of political-security risk analysis was initiated with a conflict analysis 
in which the origin and drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad were discussed. Thereafter, the 
use of the model facilitated the analysis of the industry-specific risk factors in relation to the 
conflict in eastern Chad. An overall risk rating of 77.5% was obtained, which translated into 
an extreme operational and political-security risk indication for international agencies in 
eastern Chad. This is the highest level of risk obtainable in a political-security risk analysis 
and it indicates the extremely dangerous environment within which international agencies 
operate in eastern Chad.  
 Chapter five will conclude this study by providing an overview of the course that this 
research study has taken in chapters one, two, three, and four. Thereafter, the research study 
is evaluated in light of the research questions and the aims and objectives of the study. This 
chapter will also provide recommendations for further research in the field of political-
security risk analysis for international agencies.  
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Chapter 5: Evaluation of the research study and concluding 
remarks 
5.1. Introduction 
This research study commenced with a passage in which it was noted that international 
agencies are operating in increasingly hostile environments. Eastern Chad was singled out as 
a particularly relevant example of a hostile environment, as attacks against aid workers in this 
region reached their highest level yet in 2009. Furthermore, attention was directed to 
assertions that international agencies’ risk assessment capabilities are limited; that they lack 
knowledge of the contexts within which they operate, and that they have tended to increase 
their security capacity at a practical level without due attention to the relevance of their 
security strategies. (van Brabant, 2001b: 31, Gassmann, 2005: 3, and Bruderlein, 2004: 1). 
The identification of such limitations formed the justification for asking the question as to 
whether an industry-specific political-security risk framework could be applied successfully 
in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis. In 
addition to answering this central research question, three supportive research questions were 
also identified. The first supportive question concerned what limitations the security risk 
models currently used by international agencies exhibit. The second supportive question 
addressed the practical aspects of model-building by asking what political-security risk 
factors and indicators should be included in a political-security risk model for international 
agencies. In order to test the applicability of the model developed in this study, the last 
research question asked what the current level of political-security risk in eastern Chad is for 
international agencies.  
 This chapter brings this research study to a conclusion by firstly, providing a brief 
outline of its progression up to this point. Thereafter, the research study is evaluated in light 
of the research questions and the objectives and relevance of the research study. The 
penultimate section addresses recommendations for further research in the field of political-
security risk analysis for international agencies. A final conclusion brings this research study 
to a close.  
 
5.2. Progression of the research study  
Chapter one served as a general introduction. A literature survey of the research on which this 
study is based was followed by a discussion in which the research problem was outlined. The 
objectives of the study were then discussed. The first objective was to examine the linkages 
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between the operation of international agencies in conflict zones and the political-security 
risks in these conflict zones in order to enable the development of an industry-specific 
political-security risk model that would enhance international agencies’ capacity for strategic 
risk management and risk mitigation. The second objective was to ascertain the level of 
political-security risk in eastern Chad through testing the application of the industry-specific 
political-security risk analysis model developed in this research study. The research design 
and methodology of the study were then defined. Finally, the limitations and delimitations of 
the study were delineated.  
 The focus of chapter two was the theory of risk and the analysis thereof. In this 
chapter the conceptualisation of key terms to be used in the research study was the priority. 
Key terms included political risk, political-security risk, industry-specific risk, international 
agencies and conflict zones, among others. This chapter served as the basis from which an 
industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones 
could be created.  
 Chapter three had as its central focus the development of an industry-specific 
political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. This chapter 
commenced with an analysis of the relationship between international agencies, 
contemporary conflicts, and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape, in order to 
illuminate the evolving dynamics between international agencies and political-security risk. 
Thereafter, three political risk models specific to the energy industry were analysed and the 
attributes relevant to the development of a political-security model specific to international 
agencies in conflict zones were extracted. Then, three security risk models currently utilised 
by international agencies were discussed with the primary aim of identifying their limitations, 
in order that these could be subsequently transcended through the creation of a political-
security risk model specifically for international agencies in conflict zones. This chapter 
culminated in the presentation of the relevant factors and indicators to be used in an industry-
specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones, the 
presentation of the actual model, and that of a risk-grading scale for interpreting the results of 
the model.  
 In chapter four, a political-security risk analysis of eastern Chad was undertaken. 
Here, the primary aim was to test the applicability of the model developed in chapter three 
and also to ascertain the current level of political-security risk in eastern Chad. This involved 
applying the two steps of industry-specific political-security risk analysis and resulted in an 
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overall extreme political-security risk rating for international agencies in eastern Chad using 
Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication.  
 
5.3. Evaluation of the research study 
The central research question with which this study was concerned was whether an industry-
specific political-security risk framework could be applied successfully in order to assist 
international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in conflict zones. In short, 
it has been shown that the answer to this central research question is, yes it can. More 
specifically, the three supportive research questions assisted in steering this research study so 
as to best answer the central research question.  
 By asking what the limitations of the security risk models currently used by 
international agencies are, a forum for discussion was opened up about the relevant attributes 
and more importantly, the limitations of CARE International’s, ECHO’s, and the UN’s 
approaches to security risk assessment. Building on the general critique by Bruderlein (2004: 
1), Gassmann (2005: 3), van Brabant (2001b: 31), and Bollettino (2008: 265), concerning 
international agencies’ capacity for security risk assessment, the analysis of three 
international agencies’ security risk models revealed a number of limitations. It was found 
that the security risk models currently used by international agencies are inadequate as they 
only allow an analysis of one security threat at a time and cannot therefore account for 
multiple threats or provide an overall risk rating of a conflict zone. In addition, the models do 
not provide sufficient indication as to what risk factors and indicators should comprise an 
assessment, thereby leaving the risk analysis open to gaps. It also means that the models do 
not offer a comprehensive assessment of the overall security risk environment within which 
the international agency is operating. Examination of these models did, however, reveal the 
importance of security managers having an in-depth knowledge of the contexts within which 
they are operating and this aspect was later centrally incorporated into the final model. 
 The second research question asked what factors and indicators should be included in 
a political-security risk model for international agencies. This question facilitated the 
examination of three industry-specific political risk models from the energy industry, which 
was identified as exhibiting a similar risk profile to the international agency industry. In both 
industries, organisations are willing to accept a high level of risk and moreover, it is essential 
to the nature of such organisations that they operate in high risk, high probability 
environments. From these models, attributes including methods of model building as well as 
relevant factors and indicators were extracted, all of which aided in the development of an 
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industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. 
Both the second and third research question facilitated the identification of central political-
security risk factors and indicators to be included in an industry-specific political-security 
risk model. These were then further delineated, resulting in a two-step political-security risk 
analysis process in which step one facilitates a thorough contextual knowledge of the conflict 
zone and step two, through the use of the political-security risk model, results in an overall 
risk rating of the conflict zone. 
 Research question four asked what the level of political-security risk in eastern Chad 
is. This facilitated testing of the applicability of the political-security risk model developed 
for international agencies in conflict zones and resulted in an overall risk rating of eastern 
Chad for international agencies. Moreover, the process of applying the model to eastern Chad 
tested its practical applicability as a user-friendly, praxis-orientated model. The application of 
the two steps of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones 
resulted in an overall risk rating of eastern Chad of 77.5% which, after measurement against 
Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication, confirmed an overall 
operational and political risk indication of extreme. This result showed that the model 
developed in this study can be applied successfully in order to aid international agencies with   
strategic risk analysis.  
 Specifically, in terms of the aims and objectives of the study, the model that was 
developed sought to enhance international agencies’ capacity for strategic political-security 
risk analysis in conflict zones and to overcome the limitations identified in the security risk 
models currently used by international agencies. The aims and objectives were achieved in 
the following manner. Firstly, a model was posited that allows for more than one threat to be 
analysed at a time. Moreover, the model developed in this study permits an overall political-
security risk rating of a conflict zone to be gained, in which a number of central factors and 
numerous indicators are analysed. This facilitates a comprehensive picture of the overall level 
of political-security risk faced by an international agency in a particular conflict zone.  
 Secondly, the model developed in this study ensures that an all-encompassing 
political-security risk analysis is completed, not one based entirely on the analyst’s subjective 
choice of factors and indicators. Indeed, it is obligatory to analyse the factors and indicators 
in both step one and step two. This means that the analyst embarks on step two with a 
thorough knowledge of the origin and drivers of the conflict within which the international 
agency will be, or is, operating. Taking into account Gassmann’s (2005: 3) critique that 
“most agencies admit that they have an insufficient knowledge of the context in which they 
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operate”, the mandatory conflict analysis was developed as step one of a political-security 
risk analysis. Step one was instituted in order to facilitate informed political-security risk 
analysis in step two in which four political-security risks, and the factors and indicators that 
comprise them, require analysis. 
 In response to Bruderlein’s (2004: 1) critique that “international agencies have been 
inclined to expand their security capacity at a technical level rather than reviewing the 
relevance of their security strategies”, the model developed in this study, in order to ensure its 
continuing relevance “against a backdrop of shifting trends and sudden occurrences”, was 
developed in light of the evolving relationship between political-security risk, international 
agencies, the changing nature of conflict, and the post-9/11 political-security landscape 
(Brink, 2004: 9). Moreover, the model has political risk theory as a framework. Therefore, it 
was not developed at a mere practical level, but as a model with a theoretical basis that is 
generally applicable in all conflict zones in order to aid international agencies with strategic 
political-security risk analysis.  
 The second objective of this research study was to test the practical applicability of 
the model through a case study of eastern Chad and to arrive at an overall risk rating of the 
conflict zone. This was successfully achieved. Both step one and step two industry-specific 
political-security risk analysis were shown to be practically and easily applicable and an 
overall risk rating of 77.5% was obtained, indicating that the overall political-security risk 
rating for international agencies in eastern Chad is extreme. 
 An evaluation of this research study would be remiss without mention of aspects that 
did not work out as successfully as hoped. Firstly, while the model developed in this study is 
practically applicable and testing showed that it provides an accurate political-security risk 
analysis of a conflict zone, it is not as aesthetically user-friendly as originally envisaged. Due 
to the large amount of information that had to be encapsulated in the model the font is small, 
making it difficult for the analyst to read. 
 Secondly, the model is unable to facilitate a risk rating of a particular factor that does 
not satisfy all the requirements of that rating. The question then arises as to what rating the 
analyst should give the factors in question, if aspects from both Low Risk – 2 and High Risk – 
3 are present, as it is not possible to assign a rating that is in between or, numerically 
speaking, a rating of 2.5 out of 4. This may lead to a risk analysis that is not as accurate as 
desired. This problem has no easy solution as a more complex model which can account for 
greater complexity will unfortunately involve difficult mathematics and time-consuming 
methods, making it unfeasible for use by international agencies in conflict zones. A simpler 
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model such as the one presented in this research study has the regrettable drawback of being 
less able to account for such complexities. 
 In sum, the central research question in this study was successfully answered through 
the direction of three supportive questions. Importantly, the aims and objectives laid out in 
chapter one of this research study were achieved. Due to the limited scope of the research 
study, there are a number of recommendations for further research that can be made. 
 
5.4. Recommendations for further research 
In concluding, it must be noted that this research study has focused on one small aspect of a 
field which is characterised by its wide interdisciplinary nature. This is true for both the 
humanitarian field and that of political risk. The humanitarian field encompasses the fields of 
military studies, conflict and peace studies, international relations, and international law. 
Developments in these diverse disciplines are continually affecting the operation of 
international agencies and are therefore salient when considering the current and future nature 
of international agencies’ approach to security risk assessment. This research study did not 
capture the entirety of the field in terms of current academic debate and only a small section 
of this study was devoted to understanding the multifarious influences of these fields on the 
security risks faced by international agencies. The topic of political-security risk analysis for 
international agencies in conflict zones could be further enhanced by the incorporation of the 
theories, discourses and debates emanating from the above-mentioned fields. 
 The field of political risk is truly inter-disciplinary in nature, drawing upon 
international relations, economics, finance, development studies and security studies. 
Developments in these fields are constantly informing the theory and methods of political 
risk analysis and the different branches thereof, including political-security risk analysis. In 
this regard, there is a definite need for further research in which the subject of political-
security risk is expanded upon. This research study drew attention to the fact that while 
political risk has a well-established theoretical base, the same cannot be said for political-
security risk, which is a relatively under-researched field in comparison. Here, the links 
between security studies and political risk theory need to be further researched and 
strengthened. Though this research study discussed the elements of political-security risk and 
postulated a definition, there is wide scope for further research in this regard.  
 Another recommendation concerns the type of research needed in the field of 
political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. In terms of 
identifying the strengths and limitations of international agencies’ security risk models as 
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well as the nature of the risk faced by international agencies, primary research is needed. 
Spending time in the field analysing first-hand the strengths and limitations of the security 
risk models currently used by international agencies would be extremely insightful in terms 
of understanding the processes involved and the concessions and compromises made. 
Primary research in the form of interviews with the security managers who apply these 
models on a daily basis would be invaluable. Primary research enabling a deeper 
understanding of the means, motivations and methods of rebel groups, insurgents and 
terrorists, would also be useful in informing the field of political-security risk analysis for 
international agencies in conflict zones. In sum, higher levels of primary research would 
contribute to producing knowledge of great depth, thereby facilitating better political-security 
risk models and analyses for international agencies in conflict zones.  
 Security is not just about analysing the risks facing international agencies in conflict 
zones; it is also about being able to perform risk mitigation and risk management. This 
research study did not include risk mitigation and management measures in its scope. 
Therefore, it is recommended that further research be done in which the links between 
political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones and risk mitigation 
and management measures for international agencies in conflict zones are explored. Indeed, 
the possibility exists for the two-step industry-specific political-security risk process 
developed in this study to be developed further by adding a step three (risk mitigation) and a 
step four (risk management). The addition of risk mitigation and risk management measures 
to the process would result in an all-encompassing political-security risk strategy for 
international agencies in conflict zones.   
 A last and highly important recommendation is for research to be carried out in which 
more and better quality data and statistics on humanitarian security in conflict zones is 
produced. In this study, data and statistics on incidents involving international agencies in 
eastern Chad was difficult to find. While there were many reports listing the number of 
overall incidents, actual details of all the incidents were not readily available. The nature of 
the humanitarian field, which is made up of thousands of independent agencies, may be to 
blame for the lack of information. Indeed, Bollettino (2008: 263) states that: “The absence of 
a systematic means of sharing incident data undermines the capacity of the humanitarian 
community to address proactively security threats. In discussion about humanitarian staff 
safety and security, the least common denominator remains cumulative anecdotal evidence 
provided by the many security personnel working for humanitarian organisations in the 
field”. There is therefore a need for greater reporting of incidents by international agencies 
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and also a need for a means through which this information is more readily accessible and 
intelligible.   
 
5.5. Conclusion 
International agencies consistently put themselves at risk in order to aid societies affected by 
conflict. The continuous assessment of political-security risk in a conflict zone is important in 
facilitating a successful mission and may mean the difference between life and death for 
employees of international agencies. This is especially so when one takes into account the 
nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security environment, 
which has seen the shrinking of humanitarian space, the growing politicisation and 
militarisation of aid and consequently, the increasing trend of attacks on aid workers as they 
are regarded as legitimate targets in conflict zones. 
 The very nature of international agencies means that they operate in high-risk, high-
probability environments and that they move from conflict zone to conflict zone depending 
on the urgency of the needs identified within. Furthermore, the political-security risks facing 
international agencies are unique, consisting of factors and indicators pertaining specifically 
to individual international agencies. The ability therefore of an international agency to easily 
identify and analyse political-security risk in a conflict zone is imperative. 
 In this research study it was found that the security risk models currently used by 
international agencies exhibited a number of limitations. The aim was therefore to investigate 
whether an industry-specific political-security risk framework could be applied successfully 
in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in 
conflict zones. This resulted in the development of a model in which the most salient risk 
factors and indicators for international agencies in conflict zones were selected and 
operationalised. The application of this model to the conflict zone in eastern Chad tested this 
model’s practical applicability and resulted in an extreme overall risk rating of eastern Chad.  
 The attainment of an overall risk rating for a conflict zone should, however, by no 
means facilitate a false sense of security for international agencies. Indeed, as the elements of 
risk are constantly changing, international agencies need to continually reassess the political-
security risk levels in a conflict zone in order to ensure the safety and security of their 
employees and the success of their tenure. Moreover, every international agency operating in 
conflict zones in today’s world must consider the development of a comprehensive political-
security risk analysis strategy as a priority. Indeed, the ever-present political-security risk 
characterising conflict zones need not result in the death of employees and the withdrawal of 
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international agencies. Through the adoption of an effective political-security risk analysis 
strategy, risk can be successfully understood, explained and eventually managed, thereby 
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Chronology of recent31 incidents32 involving international 
agencies in eastern Chad 
Date Incident 
2008 
January-September  More than 120 attacks against aid workers (USAID, 2008: 20) 
1 May  Fatal shooting of NGO Save the Children Director (USDS, 2010) 
8 July Armed assailants attack the MSF health facility, assaulting patients and staff (USAID, 2008: 2) 
9 July Armed men attack the Oxfam compound and attempt to burn down staff 
residences (USAID, 2008:2) 
26 July Armed attackers shoot and wound an employee of the ICRC after stopping 2 ICRC vehicles (USAID, 2008: 2) 
16- 30 September Relief agencies report 10 security incidents, including 9 break-ins or attacks 
on humanitarian facilities and one carjacking (USAID, 2008: 2) 
2009 
January - December  
More than 192 serious attacks against humanitarian staff occur (IMDC, 
2010) 
4 June Vehicle of NGO Action by Churches Together is hijacked (ACT, 2010) 
4 August 
Armed men attack a MSF compound and abduct one local and one 
international staff member. The local staff member escapes soon after, 
while the assailants hold the international member until the 1 September 
2009 (USDS, 2010) 
October 
Five Staff working for French NGO Première Urgence are kidnapped while 
travelling in convoy. The bandits only free staff when the vehicle they are 
travelling in is involved in an accident (UNHCR, 2009). 
26 October 
Armed assailants target a clearly marked UNHCR vehicle, killing the head 
of the Chadian Commission National s’Accueil et de Réinsertion des 
Réfugees (USAID, 2010: 2) 
7 November Assailants fire on a vehicle carrying members of the NGO Solidarites, killing the driver (USAID, 2010) 
9 November Armed men kidnap an ICRC international staff member. He is only released 
on 6 February 2010 (USDS, 2010) 
20 December Armed men hijack a civilian vehicle travelling with a DIS-escorted MINURCAT logistics convoy (USAID, 2010: 2). 
 
                                                           
31
 Recent refers to the period between January 2008 and December 2009. At the time of writing, information 
about incidents involving international agencies in 2010 was unavailable. 
32
 Due to the great number of incidents occurring in 2008 and 2009, only the fatal or near-fatal incidents are 




List of factors and indicators in Boshoff’s model 
 
Host country political risk (phase one) 
Political 
Macro indicators  
• Regime/political stability: Including the type of the regime in power and the political 
system (military, authoritarian, one party state, multiparty, state democratic)  
• War and security Issues: Including kidnapping, insurgency and terrorism, theft and 
pilferage, sabotage, and incidents of violence  
• Repatriation restrictions  
• Corruption/poor governance  
Micro indicators  
• Unclear legislation/security of tenure: Including threat of adverse changes in 
contracts/fiscal terms, and changing royalty/tax regimes  
• Investment constraints: Including reserve requirements, restriction on the flow of 
funds, import/export concerns, and free trade zones  
Economic 
Macro indicators 
• Economic performance: Including levels of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita, real GDP growth rate, and inflation (these indicators also assesses the 
economic stability or instability of the host country)  
• Balance of payments  
• Credit worthiness  
• Currency convertibility: Including the foreign exchange position  
Micro indicators  
• Energy vulnerability: Including the importance of petroleum to the government 
revenues and the overall economy, the integration between the oil and gas industry 
and the remainder of the national economy, and the role of foreign oil and gas 
companies in the domestic economy  
• Current account deficit  





Macro indicators  
• Internal Violence  
• Civil and Labour Unrest  
Micro indicators  
• Homogeneity: Including ethno-linguistic/racial/national divisions  
• Ethnic conflict  
• Community opposition/social licence to operate  
• Standard of living  
• Environmental activism  
Petroleum 
• Ownership  
• Domestic reserves/production  
• Host’s relative market position  
• Level and destination of exports  
• Strength of national oil company (NOC)  
• Role of the foreign company in the national oil industry  
• Oil and gas prices  
• Domestic ability to operate the industry: Including the necessary skills, technology, 
know-how, and capital  
• Ownership/contractual relationship between the firm and the host country  
 
Company political risk (phase two) 
• Nationality of the company  
• World industry positioning: Including sources of crude, reserves, production, and 
market outlets  
• Special bargaining advantage: Including technology, managerial skills, services, and 
capital 
• Host government relations: Including receptive, diplomatic, and open, or unreceptive, 






International political risk (phase two) 
• Host government international integration: Including participation in international 
treaties, conventions and organisations  
• Host/home government relations: including the political/economic relationship 
between the host and the home government, encompassing security, trade, and aid 
issues  
• World petroleum market: Including conditions relating to price, supply, and demand 
consumption  
• World economic condition: Including current and projected levels of both economic 
growth and energy consumption  


























UN definitions of descriptors 
Descriptor Definitions 
Negligible The consequences may result in minor disruption to UN system activities. 
Minor The consequences may result in some minor injuries to staff; possible damage or some loss of equipment and 
facilities; and limited delays to activities. 
Moderate The consequences may result in injury to staff; some loss of equipment and facilities; and delays to activities. 
Severe The consequences result in severe injury to staff; significant loss of equipment and facilities; and major delays 
and possible cancellation of activities. 
Critical The consequences are catastrophic, resulting in death and severe injury to staff; major loss of equipment and 
facilities; and cancellation of activities. 
Table 5: UN definitions “impact” descriptors (UN, 2004: 6) 
Descriptor Definitions 
Unlikely This event is considered as not having a realistic probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing 
conditions, i.e., monitor the situation closely.  
Moderately  
Likely 
This event is considered to have a reasonable probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing 
conditions. Effort should be made to reduce this probability, or the impact of the event occurring, i.e., review 
security procedures and arrangements.  
Likely 
This event is considered to have a high probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing conditions. 
Significant effort is required to reduce this probability, or the impact of the event occurring, i.e. review 
Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) compliance and training.  
Very Likely 
This event is considered to have a very high probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing 
conditions. Every available effort is required to reduce this probability, or the impact of the event occurring, i.e. 
relocate dependants or staff. 
Certain/ 
Imminent 
This event is considered to be imminent and will occur. The Organization must take immediate and extreme 
measures to protect itself, i.e. evacuate to a safe haven. 
Table 6: UN definitions “likelihood” descriptors (UN, 2004: 6) 
Descriptor Definitions 
Negligible 
There is little likelihood of harm to the operation. Operations generally continue with minimum interruption. 
This risk is usually acceptable. 
Low 
There may be harm to the Organization either through indirect or unintentional means. However, the likelihood 
and outcome of adverse events is unlikely to result in significant damage, injury or delay. This risk can typically 
be mitigated and therefore is generally acceptable. 
Medium 
There is significant concern for the well-being and security of the Organization. The degree of harm, or the 
likelihood of the adverse event is significant. Security officials must implement significant measures to ensure 
the security and safety of staff and the protection of the Organization. This risk is likely to be at the limit of 
acceptability. 
High 
There is considerable concern for the security and safety of staff and the Organization. The situation is often 
unpredictable, and likely to end in violence. Very specific and robust security measures must be in place before 
the Organization can safely operate. Typically only security or emergency tasks are undertaken in this 
environment. This risk is unacceptable in most situations.  
Critical 
The operating environment is extremely dangerous. Available risk mitigating factors have minimal positive 
effect or are ineffective. The probability of death, severe injury, total damage or failure is extreme. This risk is 
unacceptable except in extraordinary instances. 




Chronology33 of the origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad 
                                                           
33
 The chronology is adapted from: BBC. 2010. “Timeline: Chad: A chronology of key events”, 10 March 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1068745.stm (02 May 2010). 
Date Origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad 
1913 Chad becomes a French colony within French Equitorial Africa 
1946 Chad becomes a French overseas territory with its own territorial parliament and 
representation in the French National Assembly 
1960 Chad becomes independent and Francois Tombalbaye becomes president 
1963 Violent opposition by the Muslim north is triggered after opposition parties are banned 
 
1966 Northern revolt developes into a guerilla war 
1973 French troops aid the Chadian government in controlling the northern revolt, but guerillas 
continue operating througout the 70s and 80s with the help of weapons supplied by Libya 
1975 Tombalbaye is killed in a coup d’etat led by southern Christian, Felix Malloum 
1979 Malloum is deposed in a coup d’etat, and a coalition government headed by a Muslim 
northerner, Goukouni Oueddei assumes power 
1980 Libya provides troops to aid Oueddei in his fight against forces headed by former prime 
minister, Hissène Habré 
1981 Libyan troops withdraw at the request of Oueddei 
1982 Habré seizes power in a coup d’etat 
1983 Oueddei’s forces continue resistance in the north with the help of Libya 
1987 A combined effort of the Chadian Government with French and US assistance, force Libya 
out of the entire northern region, apart from the Aouzou strip 
1990 Habré toppled by former ally, Idriss Déby in a coup d’etat 
1996 Déby wins Chad’s first multi-party presidential election 
1997 Déby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement wins the legislative elections 
1998 Armed rebellion led by Déby’s former Defence Minister Youssouf Togoimi begins 
2001 Déby wins controversial presidential election 
2002 
January Chadian government and rebels sign Libyan-brokered peace deal to end three-year civil war 
May Fighting between government and rebels breaks out again 
October Chad becomes oil exporter 




2003 Thousands of Sudanese refugees begin arriving in eastern Chad to eascape fighting in the Darfur region of Western Sudan 
2004 Thousands of Sudanese refugees continue arriving in eastern Chad  
April - May Chadian troops clash with pro-Sudanese goverment militias as fighting in Darfur spills over into Chad 
2005 
June Constitutional changes allow Déby to stand for a third term in power 
December Rebels attack the town of Adré near the Sudanese border and Chad accuses Sudan of being behind the attacks 
2006 
January - June 
Thousands of people flee eastern Chad as Arab Janjaweed militia from Sudan’s Darfur 
region penetrate eastern Chad 
March An attempted military coup on the Chadian government is thwarted 
April Rebels seeking to topple Déby battle government forces outside the capital, N’Djamena 
May Déby wins presidential election, and opposition parties boycott the election 
November State of emergency imposed in eastern Chad after a spate of ethnic violence 
2007 
May 
Chad and Sudan agree to stop the conflict on their shared border, but this does not stop the 
violence 
September UNSC authorises a UN-EU peacekeeping force to protect civilians from the ongoing hostilities spilling over into Chad from Darfur 
October State of emergency declared in eastern Chad 
2008 
February Rebel attack reaches N’Djamena, coming close to the presidential palace 
March Chad and Sudan sign a peace accord aiming to halt the five-year-long hostilities between the 
countries 
May Hostilities between Chadian and Sudanese militias flares up, and Sudan cuts off all diplomatic and economic relations with Chad 
2009 
January 
Eight rebel groups unite to form a rebel alliance 
March EU peacekeepers in eastern Chad hand over to a larger UN force called MINURCAT 
May Major anti-government rebel offensive launched from eastern Chad 
2010 
February 
President Déby of Chad and Omar Hussein al-Bashir of Sudan hold peace talks and agree to 
deploy a joint force to monitor the situation along their shared border 
March Chad agrees to let UN peacekeeping force MINURCAT stay until 15 May 2010 
May 
UNSC votes unanimously to reduce the military component of MINURCAT from its current 
3300 troops to 2200 military personnel by 15 July 2010. Withdrawal of the remaining troops 
will begin on 15 October 2010 and all military and civilian personnel are to be withdrawn by 
31 December 2010 
